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The word "budget" originally meant the money bag or the
public purse, which served as a receptacle for the revenue and
expenditure of the state. In Britain the term was used to describe
the leather bag in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer carried
to Parliament the statement of the Government's needs and
resources. Eventually the terra came to mean the documents
which were contained in the bag --plans for government finances
submitted for the approval of the legislature.
Background
Budgets are planning documents. Some say they are only mea-
surement tools that assist management officials, whether they be boards
of directors or elected officials of governments. Still others claim that
budgets are a communications device that translates the wants and
desires of the public into actual policy commitments of the government.
Each of these phrases contains an essential element of the true definition.
A budget is a planning document that can measure the economic stature of
a country and should reflect the desires of the people. It is a financial
plan that reflects the necessary fiscal and monetary policies that are
beneficial to the national interest. This national interest also has a
variety of meanings, but in its basic form it is simply the will of the
people. Failing to provide for this will, many government officials find
they are victims of ever -increasing attacks by the opposition party or, in
the extreme, are voted out of office.
Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley
h Sons, Inc. , 1956), p. 2.

In America, this will of the people is the raison d'etre for the
political parties as they attempt to secure budgetary goals for their con-
stituencies. In reaching budget decisions, the parties must also relate
to the wants and desires of other population segments - -namely , interest
or pressure groups. These types of groups contain all elements of the
constituencies who, by their specialized nature, possess particular infor-
mation that assists officials in making responsible decisions. While these
groups are formed for a variety of reasons - -such as the environmentalists
grouping to contain pollution, or the local music appreciation groups
meeting to petition for a noise -abatement program in a town- -the most
common reason for forming is essentially economic. In seeking economic
goals, budgets thereby become a majcr focus of their attention. By no
means is this economic preoccupation to be considered a current trend.
James Madison appreciated this state of affairs when he wrote about dif-
ferent interest groups and their motives:
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever
formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors and
those who are debtors fall under a like discrimination. A landed
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a
moneyed interest, with many lesser interests grow up of necessity
in civilised nations, and divide them into different classes,
actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the principal tasks
of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party in the neces-
sary and ordinary operations of the government.
James Madison, "Federalist Paper Number 10," in Annals of
America Se ries of Encyclopedia Britannica, III, p. 297.

For these reasons, officials must use a variety of trade-offs in accom-
modating such diverse wants. Coping with the wants of constituencies
and powerful interest groups requires a delicate balancing and weighing
by the official as he approaches budgetary decisions.
Although this may be the case in America, the role of interest
groups in shaping the British budget may be of a different nature. The
purpose of this study is to identify the role and analyze the significance
of such groups in the budget -making process. Burkhead states that the
"highly centralized responsibility for financial planning by the executive,
so important in the British budget system, is a direct product of the pat-
tern of relationships between the Cabinet and Parliament. " In examining
this position, it is necessary to judge the impact of external influences on
this relationship. While Britain's development in budgeting has resulted
in such centralized responsibility, there have been parallel developments
caused by the economic environment in that pressure groups are getting
more and more vocal. With this increased vocalization and activity,
pressure groups are a force that must be considered in the shaping of any
budget policy.
Research Question
In writing this thesis, the basic research question to be answered




4budgetary process? Realizing that a study of interest groups in any given
country can well start off with over a hundr ed~page list of them alone, I
have selected only two major ones for this analysis. These two groups
are the Trade Union's Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of British
Industries (CBI). In support of this major question, the following
subsidiary questions should enable an extensive view of the subject:
1. What are the characteristics, composition, and policies
of the largest interest groups in Great Britain?
2. How does the budgetary process operate in Great Britain?
3. At which points of the budgetary cycle does it accommodate
interest group pressures and information?
4. What are some indications of responsiveness by the
Treasury and the Parliament to interest group activities?
Methodology and Organization of the Study
In order to approach this subject, the initial efforts will be made
to acquaint the reader with the descriptive attributes of the major interest
groups that exist in Great Britain. For this purpose, the TUC and the
CBI have been chosen as focal points instead of others, such as the
National Farmers Union or the National Union of Manufacturers. These
latter organizations are also major groups that are influential in the cur-
rent European Common Market aspirations of Great Britain; however,
the former two groups have a longer history, are more amenable to

political process analysis in their support for political parties, and con-
stitute larger memberships. Since there are differences in the budget
processes from American practices, it is necessary to develop this
actual process in the formulation and legislative authorization stage and
tie in the methods and techniques employed by these interest groups as
they seek to influence. The actual evaluation and assessment method to
be used will be a comparison method from the official publication each
group sends to the Chancellor of the Exchequer prior to Budget Day with
the actual budget speech, and subsequent bill by the House of Commons.
Chapter I will relate the interest group information, and Chap-
ter II will discuss the budgetary process and the roles of the principal
actors in that process. Chapter III will present a discussion of the meth-
ods and techniques utilized by each group to influence the budget. In
order for this report to have currency, the fourth chapter will discuss the
1970-71 budget and the outcomes measured against the desires of each
group.
In addition to the secondary sources of information, such as
books by British authors on interest groups, political processes, and
budgetary textbooks, much reliance will be placed on primary information
from government policy statements, the Weekly Hansards (House of
Commons Debates), and committee reports of the various groups. To
supplement this information, trade journals, manifestos (party policy
doctrines), and evidence reports to the Treasury will be used. In

evaluating the interaction between Government officials and group mem-
bers, two interviews have been scheduled with members of the British
Embassy: Mr. Campy of Industrial Relations has had long associations




INTEREST GROUPS IN GREAT BRITAIN
General Group Theory
and Interest Groups
Except for a few hermits and "knights of the road, " we are
always to be found in groups of one sort or another: we are brought
up and usually live in families, attend schools and church, play
football in teams, work in factory, office or Government Depart-
ment, become members of a trade union or college, join a political
party or the Women's Institute, are elected to Parliament, even go
to gaol. The whole structure of modern society is associational. *
This description by Wootton indicates the pervasiveness of group-
ings in society in an implied cradle -to-grave manner. Besides being born
into one such grouping, individuals go through life and join other groups
mainly on a voluntary basis. They do so because membership can afford
them the opportunity to share common beliefs and seek common goals.
Individuals are influenced by this membership and, in turn, they expect
the collective personality of the group to influence outside external
sources. Earl Latham feels that this external dimension of influence is
possible only when the groups become formally organized with clearly
defined goals. Under these conditions, groups become structures of
power because they concentrate human wit, energy, and muscle for the
Graham Wootton, The Politics of Influence (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, Ltd.
, 1963), p. 3.

achievement of given purposes.
The importance of these formal organizations and the power they
wield, whether real or imagined, leads to the development of a pluralistic
doctrine of politics. This doctrine recognizes that the conduct of govern-
ment affairs depends on two structures, namely:
. . .
Official and unofficial groups, as distinguished by their
decision-making powers. The "official" group embraces the
Cabinet, Parliament, and the Ministries. We speak of "unofficial"
groups as those involved in the petitioning side of the political
2process. u
Latham points out that this doctrine is a departure from the old idealist
type philosophy of government by stressing the writings of the Twentieth-
Century political philosophers:
Figgis, Maitland, and Laski showed that many of the /ideal-
ist/assumptions were contrary tc fact; that the state did not
absorb all the loyalties of the individual in the political community,
as had been asserted, but that many lesser associations also made
claim to the faith, attachment, devotion, and obedience of the indi-
vidual, such as church, corporation, and trade union, and these
claims were acknowledged by responsive behavior. ~>
Such a philosophy is also prevalent in current times because of
the nature of the dynamic world change. Indeed, Baskin illustrates the
reasoning of this ideology:
The increasing complexity and the quickening pace of change
in modern society prompt an increase in both the penetration of
society by government and cooperation among individuals in behalf
Earl Latham, The Group Bases of Power (New York: Octagon
Books, Inc., 1965), p. 12.
2
Wootton, The Politics of Influence, pp. 4-5.
3
Latham, The Group Bases of Power, p. 12.

of their shared interests. These separate developments converge
in the increasing tendency of organized interests to torn to govern-
ment for aid and cooperation in order to secure their own private
purposes in society.
Given the importance of groups and their existence in society,
these structures of potential power are given many names in the literature.
Milbrath defines such groupings as:
. .
.
Interest groups which have an interest in adopting a policy
which will benefit a certain segment of the public but which will
not be beneficial for the general public.
Key, on the other hand, defines such groupings as pressure groups that
constitute special segments of the society, which are an animating force
in the political process. This animating force indicates that the groups
are not merely sounding boards for public policy but are active partici-
3
pants that employ strategy and activism in reaching their goals. Finer
offers still another definition: he implies that the group possesses some
kind of sanctions authority that would be applied if a demand is refused by
government. Under this concept there is the direct possibility of the use
of threats as a weapon.
Darryl Baskin, "American Pluralism, " Journal of Politics
,
XXXII (February, 1970), 73.
Z
Lester W. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago:
Rand McNally and. Company, 1963), .p. 29.
3
V. O. Key, Jr. , Politics, Parti es, and Pressure Groups (5th
ed. ; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. , 1964), p. 17.
4
S. E. Finer, Anonymous Empire (London: Pall Mall Press,
Limited, 1958), p. 3.
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Although there are many definitions and labels for such groups,
this thesis will examine groups as pockets of specialized interests that
can take on some appearances of applying pressure. This pressure,
though, is not constant or consistent in its application; rather, it may be
such tactics as a large-scale approach of the membership to the legisla-
tive lawmakers or single approaches of the members to the Ministries.
Consequently, the referenced material contained herein will rely on the
interchangeability of the two words: pressure and interest. This is not
done to. confuse the reader; rather, it is a reflection on the part of the
author that the two terms are considered synonymous.
Any descriptions of group activity must also consider the nature
of the objectives that the group espouses. The general areas of the
objectives fall into two broad categories of "economic objectives and
non-economic objectives." W ootton identifies these general characteris-
tics of over -all British group objectives by focusing on the economy of
the country:
The production of goods and services in this country gives rise
to an economic surplus and thus it is the business of many pressure
groups to influence its own allocation in a certain way.
This theory, which centers around economics, is not an illusion but a
mirror of the real world. Latham also asserts that the discussion of
Wootton, The Politics of Influence, p. 7.
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groups must indeed contain the economic ramifications for economics
is one of the focal points of group theory.
The economic theory of a century ago fixed the nature of the
economic universe by definition and tended to derive its character-
istics by deduction, an economic world inhabited by a multiplicity
of individuals in isolation, when combination was a pathological
deviation. Such a defined (not observed) universe could not fail to
work- -in the realm of discourse. So far have we come from this
view that a whole new vocabulary has been invented to explain the
operations of an economic community formed of aggregations, clus-
ters, blocs, and combinations of people and things --not individuals
in isolation.
This economic preoccupation is the prime concern of this thesis as the
interactions and processes of interest groups are analyzed with respect
to the British budgetary process.
Types of B ritish Liter est Groups
It has been said that whenever two or more Englishmen are
gatheied together there exists a club. British society as a whole
is a mass of clubs and associations. ^
This statement indicates that there are a multitude of specialized interests
in Great Britain that clamor for recognition of their goals and objectives.
In the latest Directory of British Associations in 1967, there are some
6,000 organizations listed that are national in scope. If the professional
and charitable units were removed, there would still be perhaps well over
3,000 organizations that are characterized by special economic interests,
Latham, The Group Bases of Power, p. 5.
Sir Ivor Jennings, K. B. E.
, Q, C. , Parliament (Cambridge,
England: The University Press, 1957), p. 185.
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and this does not include the local organizations that are often petitioning
their government.
The classification of these organizations is quite difficult in that
every segment of the economy is affected by the "joining" attitude of the
Twentieth Century. Beer sees two large categories: producer groups
and consumer groups.
Producer groups represent the main sectors of the economy:
trade unions, trade associations, and professional organizations.
Consumer groups are all others where a number of voters whose
material well being is affected in the same way by some measure
of government action, actual or prospective.
This type of classification scheme is too broad as it does not pinpoint the
sectional interests that vie for attention. Finer's classification system
is more useful in that he shows how different needs can be satisfied by
the wide variety of interest group organizations. His studies indicate
eight categories exist- -namely , the Business Group, the Labour Group,
the Cooperative Movement, the Professions, Civic Groups, Specialized
3
Groups, Religious Groups, and Education/ Recreational groups. Table 1
illustrates these classifications and presents examples of each category.
This scheme is not sacrosanct nor perhaps is it fully comprehensive;
1
Ibid.
, pp. 18 5-188.
2Samuel H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New
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however, it does point out that Great Britain's interest groups are
"innumberable and ubiquitous. "
Interest groups do not have to be permanent institutions such as
the Trades Union Congress or the .National Farmers Union in order to
build a successful following that may bring influence to bear. Some of
Britain's interest groups are also formed for one-time purposes, such as
the Popular Television Association. Wilson describes this organization's
purpose as a group of individuals that desired commercial television in
Great Britain.
Their efforts in furthering the enactment of the Independent
Television Act of 1954 were considered more effective than the
Conservative voters of the period, the constituency organizations,
or even the members of the Parliamentary Party.
He attributes their participation as being one of the key factors in the
legislation's success. The various types of groups that exist in Great
Britain, whether permanent or temporary, all have the common denom-
inator: to influence external sources, government or others, to derive
benefits for their members.
The Selection of Tw o
Major Interest Groups
Because of the large number of groups that have potential power




H. H. Wilson, The Campaign for Commercial Television
(London: Seeker h Warbury, Ltd., 1961), p. 208.
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two majo.r interest groups. The selection of the TUC and the CBI is not
arbitrary; rather, it is a calculated effort based on the nature of their
organization, the feeling of the general British public, and the reliance that
the government places on these organizations for information. For these
reasons, such groups as the National Farmers Union or the myriad number
of individual unions, while important in the conduct of British affairs, are
not suitable to such a micro-study.
For the first reason, both of these industrial organizations claim
to represent the majority of employees and employers in Great Britain. In
this age of collective bargaining and negotiations, where wages and prices
play such an important part in the economy of a country, it is necessary to
focus on the policies and programs of these organizations. The British
budget has a profound effect on the lives of such people and because of its
economic consequences, it is only natural to examine their relations to the
government. Additionally, both groups also present opposing forces as
they seek to attain their objectives. The TUC aspires to better working
conditions for its members, a higher standard of living, and the enjoyment
of the fruits of their labor through obtaining more consumer income. The
CBI, on the other hand, seeks the old standby of freedom of restraint of
their managerial processes, which must include a minimization of costs of
production. Such forces, diametrically opposed, must indeed bring their
battles to the political arena.

16
Secondly, these two groups represent considerable influence in the
minds of the general public. In 1964, Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir con-
ducted a study of the North Stockport constituency. This study provides an
analysis and comparison of British public views on certain topics and is con-
sidered to be an over -all generalization of the British public at large. While
it was only a small sample, the typical nature of the sample groups is consid-
ered representative of the voting constituencies of Great Britain. In this
survey, the respondents were asked to rate five choices of influence in the
nation. The results in Table Z indicate that 81 and 63 per cent of the
respondents felt that big business and trade unions influenced the government
a lot or too much. Clearly, these two groups have set up perceptions in
tht: genera} public's mind about their influence capabilities at the government
level. Such perceptions may be subjected to an analysis of interest group
influence.
Thirdly, government in the day -by -day affairs and policy formula-
tion places great reliance on these two groups for information and consulta-
tion purposes.
The government knows that these groups have particular knowl-
edge, not merely of opinions, but of facts. The statistical and
research departments of these groups can supply information with a
technical know-how and an expertise that provides government with
a sound test.
Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A
Functional Analysis, " Political Studies
, XV (June, 1967), 185-186.
J. D. Stewart, British Pressure Groups (Oxford: The Clarendon




INFLUENCE OF GROUPS UPON GOVERNMENT AS SEEN BY SAMPLE
Group A Lot Too Much A Little None Don't Know
Prime Minister 62%
t
5% 22% 5% 6%
Members of Parliament 54 4 31 8 3
Big Business 52 29 11 2 6
The Press 46 11 27 9 7
Trade Unions 39 24 24 2 11
Television 36 6 30 18 10
Senior Civil Servants 30 6 30 12 22
Church of England 17 2 39 31 11
The Queen 13 2 35 43 7
Source: Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections, " p. 185.
Additionally, he feels that these groups have been brought into the formal
structure of government through advisory committees. These advisory com-
mittees are a public recognition of the groups as rightful bodies to advise
government. The extent of such participation will be explored in Chapter III.
The TUC and the CBI are only two of the interest groups in Great
Britain, but the potential influence they exert upon government may be




at these organizations and see how they derive the power attributed to thein
by government and the public at large.
The Trades Union Congress
This organization, national in scope, comprises some 10,302,000
members out of a potential work force of 25 million. This membership is
approximately 41 per cent of the British work force and its significance is
important if measured against the 1969 United States figures of 18, 774, 000,
or 23 per cent that is a unionized work force. The total number of British
trade unions that are represented is 150 national unions with indirect links
to over 150 more localized unions. Of more importance, all large national
unions representing over 100, 000 members are affiliated except the National
Union of Teachers.
The unions that constitute the total are representative segments of
every trade imaginable. Table 3 highlights this classification system and
it is quite apparent that the TUC comprises a potential power if not by its
actions at least by its size and diversified membership. What is not evident
from the table is the fact that only six individual unions from the 150 total
constitute over one -half of the total TUC membership, and these six can
effectively make policy for the annual conferences by right of their block
voting power. The six by name are the Transport and General Workers'
Union; the National Union of Mineworkers; the Amalgamated Engineering
Allen Campy, Assistant Labor Attache, interview held at the






TRADE GROUP AND NUMBER OF UNIONS
Group Number




Engineering, Founding, and Vehicle Building ... 13
Technical, Engineering, and Scientific 5
Electricity 1
Iron and Steel and Minor Metal Trades 1Z
Building, Woodworking, and Furnishing 9
Printing and Paper 6
Textiles 25
Clothing 5
Leather and Boot and Shoe 5





Professional, Clerical, and Entertainment .... 12
General Workers 2
Total: 150
Source: Whitaker 's Almanack, 1971 (London: J. Whitaker &
Sons, Ltd.




Union; the National Union of General and Municipal Workers; the Union of
Shop, Distributive, and Allied Workers; and the National Union of Railway-
men. Their combined total representation is over 5 million. The trade
movement and TUC involvement is a far cry from the 118, 000 members
2
who were represented in 1868 when it was founded.
In September of every year, the TUC holds an annual conference
for the purpose of electing new officers, discussing policy positions, and
holding discussions on the Annual Report of the General Council. This
conference consists of 1,000 representatives that are chosen to attend from
the various trade groups. The selection of these candidates is based on a
proportionate basis with the membership that the trade group represents.
The primary purpose is to elect a General Council of 36 representativ es
3
who constitute the working body of the Congress on a year-to-year basis.
In addition to the trade group representatives, provision is also made for
the election of two women, and all unions with women members may nomi-
4
nate candidates for these seats. In addition to this General Council, a
General Secretary is an elected official, who is charged with carrying out
Bryn Roberts, The Price of TUC Leadership (London: George
Allen and Unicorn, Ltd., "961), pp. 124-130.
2
Trades Union Congress, Trade Unionism: Evidence in the Royal






Political Economic Planning, British Trade Unionism (London:
Political Economic Planning, 1955), p. 133.
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the policy of the Council. The Council itself meets once a month on over -all
planning and policy, but the members of the Council are also chairmen of
the working departments of the TUC which carry out the day -by -day work-
load. These departments are the Economic, Education, International,
Organizational, Production, and Social Insurance Departments. These
units arc the ones that maintain the close liaison with Ministries, with the
different unions, and with their counterparts of industry- -the employers.
The maintenance of this structured organization is by monthly assessment
of dues on each of the affiliated unions.
The over -all central purpose of the TUC is "to provide a continuous
association of wage earners for the purpose of improving the condition of
2
their working lives. " To achieve this set purpose, the Evidence provided
to the Royal Commission indicates the following six objectives:
1. To promote full employment and national prosperity - -full
employment is the precondition for rising output and rising real
income.
2. To promote security of employment and income - -there can
be no national interest without providing for individual interests
despite change.
3. Fair share of national income and wealth- -to achieve a more
equitable distribution of income for all.
4. Voice in government- -to prevent arm's length bargaining
with government - -thereby permitting two-way influence.
5. Improvement of public and socialized services --to improve
the social security aspect for the worker.







6. To promote industrial democracy- -enhance the collective
bargaining structure throughout industry.
These objectives are clear-cut and sound very impressive; yet, the scope
of its over -all authority is limited by the nature of its membership. The
unions are autonomous members of the organization that withholds the
authority of speaking out on certain subjects. While this autonomy may not
affect the policy discussions or consultations, each member union maintains
its individual right. A case in point is the right to strike, which is not
vested in the Congress but in the individual unions. Roberts sums up this
right of autonomy by stating, "Neither Congress nor the General Council
can override the autonomy of the affiliated unions and none of their decisions
... 2
is binding upon tbe affiliated unions. " Although this appears to be a serious
limitation, one has only to look at the over -all objectives and see that such
decisions as requesting tax cuts, increased old-age benefits, or dissolution
of purchase taxes may not cause too much conflict with the member unions.
The TUC is a formal organization designed to meet members'
needs.
From a struggling pressure group the TUC has become a major
influence on the social, political, and economic life of the country.
It is an axiomatic feature of any government's policy for the TUC to




Roberts, The Price of TUC Leadership, p. 32.
3




, 1969), p. 51.
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How that influence affects budgetary policy and budget decisions is the
question to be answered.
The Confederation of
British Industries
This interest group, unlike the TUC, has almost 95 years to go
before it celebrates its centennial. Chartered on July 30, 1965,
. . .
the CBI has been founded to promote the prosperity of British
Industry. It combines in a single, democratic, and voluntary
association the roles previously pkiyed by the British Employees
Confederation, the Federation of British Industries, and the National
Association of British Manufacturers.
Today, this company consists of 11,400 individual companies and their
affiliates; 218 separate trade associations; 14 associate members (the
nationalized industries); and 4,000 small independent firms. In addition,
2
the organization has representatives in over 100 foreign countries. If
sheer numbers have any effect or relationship to influence, the CBI is
more powerful than the TUC. The comparison that Armstrong makes is
of the member industries and the number of employees that the member
employs. In this way he sees that "in many major industries, federated
companies employed 80 per cent or more of the industry's work force and
3
in few industries is the proportion below 50 per cent. " This comparison
is not without meaning since the TUC can speak for only 41 per cent of the
»C. B. I. Launched, " Board of Trade Journal, CLXXXIX (Sep
temper 17, 1965), 616
2






labor force and there is a possibility that the CBI may provide the leader-
ship in industrial and economic relations. Of course, such large numbers
can also affect policy making because of the diversity of the employer
members.
The creation of the CBI, or even any of its antecedent employer
associations, did not come about by accident. The trade union movement
sought to eliminate the '"rational-economic" man theory from the minds
of management as it proclaimed the dignity of man. With the inroads that
it made in removing sweat shop techniques, reducing long working hours,
and raising wage levels, the trade unions became a pressure on management.
To answer these demands and meet the pressures of the trade unions, man-
agement and employers created associations to fill this need. The impor-
tance of the growth of employers associations is also evident from the
changing technology and the need for government controls on much of the
economic structure of the country. As Samuclson points out, western
countries have a mixed economy- -elements of government control inter-
mingle with the private market elements to organize production and con-
sumption, which, in turn, creates a need for management to band
together for effective bargaining. For these two reasons, employers
associations sprung up and will probably remain for a long time.
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysi s (7th
ed. ; New York:, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 48.
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Employer organizations are of three varieties:
1. A type designed to protect and promote trading interests of
the firms.
2. A type that acts on behalf of the firms in their capacity as
employers.
3. A type that caters both for the trade and employment func-
tions of firms.
The CBI comprises in its membership all of these types as can be seen by
a partial listing of its members. Such members as the National Union of
Manufacturers would be interested in the third type for their membership
is a cross -section of industries that are plagued by employer actions and
because they seek external as well as internal markets for their member
firms. The National Chamber of Trade consists of retailer members who
as members of CBI seek trading freedoms. The British Employer's Con-
federation is concerned with employee -employer relations in the collective
bargaining field and they, too, form a core of the CBI membership under
2
a predominant type -two category. The CBI embraces the totality of the
British economy and must be considered a potential influence in budgetary
decisions.
Like the TUC, there is a governing secretariat of 400 members
that are selected yearly from the large, medium, and small business and
employer associations. Unlike the TUC, the CBI does not meet annually to
Armstrong, Industrial Relations, p. 54.
2
Finer, Anonymous Empire, pp. 8-9.
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decide over -all policy or elect representatives; rather, the selection proc
ess is based on mailed ballots and questionnaires to the members. The
day -by -day functioning of the organization is handled by 27 steering com-
mittees that parallels the functions of the TUC departments. The major
difference between these groupings is that specialized needs such as
Finance, Taxation, and Income policy are differentiated in the CBI, while
amalgamated in the TUC under the Organizational Department. The finan-
cing of this organization and their committees are by annual subscription
based on wages paid for the previous year by the firm. This financing,
such as one shilling per every 100 pounds paid wages, provides flexibility
of financing that makes provision for prosperous or recession times.
This structure does, also, enable them to provide the multitude of func-
tions that its membership requires.
The functions of the CBI are four -fold:
1. Establish negotiation with unions on basic wages and condi-
tions as well as serve as the employer's representative in devising
procedures for avoiding disputes. In this function, CBI liaison with
the TUC is essential.
2. Serve as "political" agent for its members by making repre-
sentations to government departments and ministers.
3. Provide a central agency of advice, help, guidance, and
information to its members.
1,rC.B.I. Launched, "p. 617.
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4. Serve as representatives on many advisory committees with
government and private individuals or associations on technological
problems
.
Like the TUC, the membership is not bound by resolution and deci-
sions. It appears that both organizations are not decision-making bodies
that can command, but rather they serve as information -processing vehicles
that advise the membership and government of general over -all economic
policy. This does not say that they cannot provide services, for clearly
their functions indicate a pooling of expertise is essential in providing a
united front. However, the autonomy of the membership appears to hamper
both organizations in their attempt to be "true" spokesmen for their groups.
Clearly, the TUC and the CBI must have some influence on govern-
ment policy. It is the task of this thesis to examine the relationships with
government and to assess the influence on the budgetary decisions of
Great Britain's government.
Armstrong, Industrial Relations, pp. 59-61

CHAPTER II
THE BRITISH BUDGET AND BUDGETARY PROCESS
The British Budget is no longer one of the great events of
Western civilization, an American economist said recently, but
it is still interesting and it has its own mystique. In the United
States, the budget is a bore to the average American. In Britain,
the budget brings to almost everyone instant delight or despair.
This is because it is the annual message that raises or lowers
excise taxes and often changes corporate taxes and sales taxes.
Consequently, it is seen not only as a means of raising revenue
and redistribution of income but also as a stimulus or a restraint
on the economy. The Budget is /therefore/ a centerpiece of
economic management.
From this description, it is apparent that the budget is an impor-
tant event in the life of the British. In order to evaluate the effect of
influence on this document by the TUC and the CBI, it is necessary to
trace broadly its historical development, to identify the budgetary process,
and to investigate the roles of the major governmental actors in its formu-
lation stages. Such an exposition will enable a clearer perspective of how
these groups can influence the budgetary decisions as well as highlight the
major recipients of the interest group's "pressures" and information.
These descriptions will also help in identifying the constraints that the
interest groups must work within to achieve their objectives.
John M. Lee, "British Budget Day Approaches, " The New York






The roots of British budgeting can be traced back to the times of
King John. The first effort of developing a budgetary concept was strictly
related to the taxation question and, surprisingly, initiated from the
Monarch.
In 1213, he summoned to Oxford four knights per shire (local
authorities in charge of the actual assessment and collection of
taxes), appointed by the sheriffs to discuss taxation.
This first step towards representative consultation on questions of taxation
was followed by the Barons at Runnymeade when they "extracted the famous
concession that no extraordinary scutage or aid shall be imposed on our
2kingdom unless by common counsel of our kingdom. " The Parliament of
this century was still not completely representative since it consisted
mainly of supporters of the monarchs and reigning officials. In 1295,
Kdward I set up the first "model parliament. " It was a model parliament
in that it adequately represented all classes. From the nobility came earls
and barons; from the clergy came archbishops and bishops, and abbots and
priors and deans of cathedrals; and from the commons came two knights
per shire and other representatives from more than one hundred cities and
boroughs. In 1332, this city and borough representation, as well as the
knights, formed the House of Commons. The development of the principle
Paul Einzig, The Control of the Purse (London: Seeker and
Warbury, 1959), p. 36."
G. M. Trevelyan, A Shortened History of England (London:
Penguin Books, 1959), p. 147.
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of taxation by consent and the major instrument of control on that principle
thus began in the Fourteenth Century. This was true even though the prin-
ciple came to be violated in the ensuing centuries by some "absolute
monarchs. "
Despite the violations of the principle, the Commons started evolv-
ing real control over taxation by placing conditions on taxation for certain
specified purposes. Although indirect taxes as well as customs duties were
considered ancient rights of kings, the Commons authorized them for speci-
fied, although long, periods of time. On all direct taxes, however, the
Commons granted them for shorter periods, usually for one year, so the
2
King was compelled to summon this House more frequently. Control over
revenues was more evident in this period than control of expenditures.
It was not until the Seventeenth Century that saw the development
of direct parliamentary control over expenditures that supplemented the
indirect control which the raising of revenues had provided. During the
reign of Charles I, two important committees were created- -namely , the
Committee on Supply in 1629 and the Ways and Means Committee in 1641.
The former sat as a body to vote expenditures, while the latter 's function
was to raise the money for Supply out of existing funds or create new ways
to finance such expenditures. These committees have stayed in existence
Arthur Lyon Cross, A Shorter Histo ry of England and Great
Britain (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939), p. 115.




through the present day.
In the latter part of the Seventeenth Century, when Charles II
found himself in financial difficulties because of the Dutch war and his per-
sonal extravagances, bargaining became a tool that enhanced the Commons
supremacy. Finances voted to the King became earmarked for definite
purposes, parliamentary audit of the King's accounts started in 1667, and
a resolution was approved by Charles that all bills of Supply should origi-
nate in the House and they "ought not to be changed or amended by the
Lords. " After the Revolution of 1688, further advances in expenditure
control were achieved in that the Civil List (1688-89) was created. This
list "separated the expenditures of the Crown from the expenditures of the
3
state and the Crown expenditures were limited to a specified amount. "
Through the Eighteenth Century, the Commons consolidated the gains :n
expenditure control by the passage of the Customs and Excise Act of 1787.
This Act
. . .
provided that the several duties of Customs, Excise, Stamps
and many more should be carried to, and constitute a Fund to be
called the Consolidated Fund and which then directed that all public
annuities should be payable out of the Consolidated Fund.
1 2
Cross, A. Shorter Histo ry, p. 370. Ibid.
2
Burkhead, Budgeting, p. 3.
3
Sir Herbert Brittain, K.C.B., K. B.E., The British Budgetary
System ( London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , 1959), p. 14.
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This Civil List and Excise Act provided a backdrop for the firm presenta-
tion of facts and figures on the finances needed to carry on the affairs of
the Crown as well as of the state.
These developments all helped to create the "executive budget"
concept. Originally in 1330, Sir John Gildesburgh, the Speaker of the
House, proposed that the King should prepare a clear statement of sums
involved while the King's Council should produce the schedule of such sums.
This concept developed individual bills but never a complete summation of
financial .plans of the King. After the Revolution of 1688 and the true birth
of parliamentary government, "Standing Order 66 of the House" formalized
the aspect that only executive proposals form the basis of money requests.
Through the. ministers, the responsibility of the Crown to recommend
financial requests was implanted and the House of Commons made sure
this responsibility was fixed.
The complete budget presentation concept as one complete docu-
ment was not significantly developed until the Gladstonian era starting in
1853. He ushered in the era of fiscal responsibility by presenting a budget
that was similar to a consolidated cash budget. All items of expenditure
were listed and the means he proposed to raise the necessary revenue.
Uses and sources of funds were spelled out in definitive arithmetical
2
terms. Gladstone was also responsible for the:
Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy: The Role of the Treasury
(London: Seeker & Warbury, 1969), pp. 71-72.
2




creation of the Public Accomits Committee in the Commons in
1861, although the Committee became a really effective instrument
only after the Exchequer and Audit Department Act of 1886, another
milestone in the history of Britain's financial administration.
These acts set up a parliamentary committee to review expenditures and
an independent Comptroller and Auditor General to carry out audits on
spending. Legislative control and the essentiality of executive responsibility
became crystallized concepts.
The final development that enhanced the supremacy of the Commons
of the two Houses of Parliament in budgetary matters was the passage of the
Parliament Act of 1911. The House of Lords was subordinated to the House
of Commons in that financial legislation may become law within one month
of its being passed by the Commons, regardless of the attitude of the Lords.
Such financial legislation is that which has been so designated by the Speaker
of the House of Commons. This Act was a direct result of the dispute on
the 1909 Budget when the Lords rejected the same in toto. The House of
Commons thus developed, after 600 years, its major position on financial
2
bills and related Budget proposals.
Since King John, every passing century has contributed elements to
the budgetary process in Great Britain. The significant landmarks: suprem-
acy of the Commons; executive responsibility for the budget; elements of
Sein Lin, "Legislative Control of Public Expenditure Through
Statutory Audit" (unpublished Master's thesis, The George Washington Uni-
versity, 1963), p. 9.
2Graeme C. Moodie, The Government of Great Britain (2d ed. ;
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), pp. 106-107.
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control on taxation and expenditure; and techniques and principles of
representative taxation- -all provide an integral part of the British budgetary
process today.
The Budg etary Process
On that day in late March or early April, when the government offi-
cial (Chancellor of the Exchequer) steps before the entire House of Commons
to deliver his annual budget message, much preparation, economic soul
searching, and forecasts of trends will have been accomplished. The initial
preparation is traced back 14 months when the heads of the departments for-
warded their forecasts of preliminary expenditures. General guidelines
have been previously furnished each department by the Treasury and through
the Cabinet by the Chancellor for major government departments. These
forecasts are refined and recalculated twice more before the summer con-
ferencesbegin. In addition to the expenditure forecasts, revenue forecasts
are presented by the "Revenue Departments" of Inland Revenue and Customs
and Excise Taxes. From these submissions , the Treasury accountant- -not
a policy maker or elected off icial- -compiles his first "Exchequer Prospects
Table, " which will be used by the summer conference committee.
This Exchequer Prospects Table becomes the working document of
the summer conferences of the Budget Committee, which consists of senior
economic advisors of the Treasury, heads of the Treasury's Public Sector
and Finance Group, a Bank of England representative, and the permanent
secretary of the Board of Trade. The series of meetings that they conduct
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lasts from July to March as they prepare the Executive Budget. A National
Income Forecast for the summer is developed, which takes the expenditures
and revenues and uses these figures to "predict the growth of demand and
output in relation to the country's productive capacity and the balance of pay-
ments on the hypothetical assumption that nothing is done in the Budget. "
Using the additional figures that are coming in throughout the year on such
items as national investment and productivity rates, an Autumn Forecast is
prepared by the end of November. The Chancellor, as head of the Treasury
(he holds, this position in actual concert with the Prime Minister, whose
2
official title is the First Lord of the Treasury), holds meetings with eco-
nomic advisors, heads of the Revenue Departments, as well as informal
bargaining sessions with the Cabinet department heads on pet projects and
3
other expenditure proposals.
In December, departments submit final firm estimates based on
the informal meetings with the Chancellor. The Treasury Accountant with
the assistance of the Budget Committee's preliminary findings works out a
Revised Exchequer Prospects Table. This revision becomes the Chancel-
lor's official document and starts his personal involvement in the process.
During January, much of the time is taken up by meetings of the Committee
Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 61.
2
Henry Roseveare, The Treasury (London: Allen Lane, The
Penguin Press, 1969), p. 114.
3
Brittan, Steering the Economy, pp. 60-62.
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and the Chancellor from which comes agreement and preparation of the
Final National Income Forecast. This final tabulation of expenditures is
published as the Estimate of Supply in the Vote on Account.
The procedure of divorcing expenditures from the revenue measures
is due to the definition of the fiscal year in Great Britain. It goes from
April 1 to March 31, so previous yearly Supply Appropriations are valid
only until March 31. The Estimates become introduced to Parliament, dis-
cussed and authorized by the Committee of Supply therein, sanctioned by the
Ways and Means Committee, and passed by March 3 1 as Votes on Account.
When the Budget is introduced, final estimates are compiled and all expendi-
2
ture measures are legitimized by the Appropriations Act in August.
The next two months are the most crucial for discussions on taxa-
tion and fiscal policy. While the Prime Minister has been apprised of the
Budget in January, the tenet of the financial plans in the final stages is not
the Prime Minister's but the Chancellor's. At the end of this period, the
Finance Bill is drafted of the total revenue requests, changes and additions
of various taxes, and the other principal methods of raising revenue. It is
the Chancellor who puts the final touches on the bill and, although he may










The discussion of the Chancellor with this Committee during this
phase is in general treated like a military secret- -except the Budget
security is usually more effective. Until the pre -Budget printing in
early March, no more than two dozen people are allowed to know
what's happening: even with secretaries and typists, the total number
is no more than forty. *•
When the document is finished, and about a few days before "Budget
Day, " the Chancellor will discuss it in a general way with the Cabinet.
Additionally, he will discuss it with the Queen on the night before the speech.
The day of the Budget speech is arbitrarily set by the Chancellor, but it is
usually some time in April, for it must be presented before the fourth of
May by law. The income tax year, different from the fiscal year, goes from
April 6 until April 5 and, according to the provisions of the Provincial Col-
lection of Taxes Act of 1913, a renewal resolution must be passed within
one month after the expiration of the tax year. Therefore, any budget that
seeks a continuance of the income tax or changes thereof, must allow the
Commons the opportunity to discuss and act upon such a resolution in a
2
timely manner.
Finally on "Budget Day, " after the Chancellor's speech, which
contains the economic outlook of the country for the coming year, the
changes in expenditure, and the taxation proposals, he moves the necessary
resolution. This resolution states, "It is expedient to amend the law with
respect to the national debt and the public revenue and to make further
Brittan, Steering the Economy
, pp. 66-67.
2
Brittain, The British Budgetary System, pp. 22-23.
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provision in connection with finance. " This resolution is accepted by the
Committee of Ways and Means and voted on by the Committee of the whole
House. At this point, the Finance Bill, the legislation that deals with the
revenues, is introduced for the first time, having been signed by the Chair-
man of Ways and Means, then the Chancellor. This first reading, which
includes all the detailed changes, additions, etc.
,
is not open for amend-
ment and other House business is carried on. On the second reading,
usually within two weeks, general debate is initiated by a junior member of
the Treasury, who defends the Bill's contents. This debate is dealt with in
the Committee of the whole House and only if there are no proposed amend-
ments to specific clauses, the voting will take place in the same committee.
With amendments, the procedure has to start all over at second reading
through the Ways and Means Committee, then the Committee of the whole
House. After the third reading is taken in the whole House, no amendments
may be offered, and it is usually passed and forwarded to the Lords for
Z
assent, in accordance with the 1911 Parliament Act provisions. (See
Table 4 for a summary of the process. )
It is important to clarify that the Budget contains both expenditure
and revenue measures; however, the bulk of the expenditure requests is
already known by February and presented to the Parliament. The Commit-
tee of Supply will have voted on some of these elements of expenditure prior
Jennings, Parliament
, p. 320.





Month Significant Events Information
July Budget Committee starts Summer National Income
Forecast "Preliminary
Exchequer Prospects Table"
October Public investment figures
agreed for forthcoming year
November Chancellor has preliminary Autumn National Income
talks with department officials Forecast
December "Revised Exchequer Pros-
pects Table"
January Budget Committee presents Estimates of expenditures
first report; intensive discus- for coming year agreed
sions with Chancellor; Chan-
cellor consults with Prime
Minister
February Main outline of Budget agreed Final National Income
Forecast up-to-date
Early March Tax details formulated Exchequer presents Table
March Finance bill discussed
Committee -Chancellor;
speech written; changes
Early April Pre -budget Cabinet meeting;
Queen
April Budget Day Financial statement pub-
- lished
May -June Finance bill in Commons




to the actual Budget speech. The Budget speech that is excitement for all
is primarily concerned with the raising of revenues. This financing method
through the medium of the Finance Bill is the main focus of this thesis.
While expenditures are important, the raising of revenues is more impor-
tant to the interest groups. If the TUC and the CBI are looking out for the
welfare of their individual members, they will be more concerned with the
level of income tax, the purchase taxes, the corporation and excise taxes
that are levied on individuals and companies. Additionally, even if expen-
ditures are somewhat higher than expected, the Chancellor can finance the
deficit by borrowing and not tamper with the individual's pocket book. Con-
sequently, the remaining discussion will be related to the Finance Bill and
the term Budget will be related to the revenue side. This clarification is
verifiable by looking at the TUC's own words in giving evidence to the
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations. It sees
that one of its main functions for its membership is to have its "Economic
Committee submit to the Government a statement of the economic situation
and the recommendations for the revenue legislation of the budget. '
Because of the different budget terminology, an Appendix is provided for
reference. This section will identify most of the terms and provide an
American analogy wherever practical.
Trades Union Congress, Trade Unionism, p. 18.
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The Role of the Chancellor
and the Treasury
In examining the principal actors in the budgetary process, the
role of the Chancellor and the Treasury must be the immediate focal point.
According to Finer, the agency which prepares the budget tends to become
predominant over the other departments. This is inherent in the nature of
the Executive Budget for the cardinal principle is budget unity. This unity
is apparent by the Treasury's role in collecting budget information,
assessing the economic implications, and, together with the Chancellor,
providing a budget for some 55 million people. While this was true in
1950, its power has been enhanced by the amalgamation in 1969 of the pre-
vious separate Department of Economic Affairs. This department for its
short reign had usurped some of the Treasury's planning prerogatives.
The Economist is very explicit about this restoration of power:
Last autumn's mercy killing of the Department of Economic
Affairs not only marked the final demise of the Labour Government's
attempt to redistribute some parts of economic planning under a
more political roof than Treasury corridors encourage. It also
allowed the Treasury to capture the longer term economic planning.
This has now been reunited with the short-term planning that the
Treasury has always controlled, and that has been the central bas-
tion of its power. Next. Tuesday, when the Chancellor discloses the
assessment of Britain's economic prospects in the coming year,
which will frame his Budget proposals, the Treasury alone will have
been responsible for it.
S. E. Finer, A Primer of Public Adm inist ration (London:
Frederick Muller, Ltd.
, 1950), p. 54.




.Its power stems also from another source in its obsession for
secrecy. Secrecy on the Budget does not only prevent disclosure to out-
side sources, but also within departments of the government. The power
implication here is that the officials of the Treasury are privy to informa-
tion that is wanted on the outside or by other departments, thereby setting
it aloof from the other government agencies. This secrecy aspect is defi-
nitely a constraint on interest groups and its nature will be discussed later
in this chapter.
A third factor of its power is present in the protective duties
aspect of revenue. Acting on recommendations from the Board of Trade
and in consideration of maintaining and promoting external trade of the
United Kingdom, the Treasury can set import duties on commodities. While
this must be done in consideration of international agreements, it possesses
a large degree of flexibility. Its only restraint is that the House of Com-
mons can nullify an impost or increase in duties within 28 days after the
duty has been made. This then leaves a potential power to the Treasury in
2
protecting home industries.
Of more importance is the role of the Chancellor. On all major
policy matters, a normal Cabinet procedure is that the "principles are dis-
cussed, the details worked out in committee, and the full proposals are
Brittan, Steering the Economy
, p. 33.
2
Brittain, The British Budgetary System, p. 91.
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circulated and debated. " The Budget, although a major policy, is ;m
exception, being the prerogative of the Chancellor. Consultations are not
solicited and the only purpose of the pre -Budget Cabinet is to inform rather
than seek collective agreement. In this manner, he alone has been with the
Budget for the last 14 months with the last four months consisting of direct
personal involvement. He is the man who lias made decisions out of the
forecasts and statistics of the previous year outturn; consequently, he con-
siders himself the author as well as the responsible individual for the
Budget. Such a perception started from the Gladstonian era in I860. At
that time Gladstone started the erosion of Cabinet authority in discussing
tax changes. When the Cabinet asked for a month to discuss the impending
Budget, he refused and granted them only a week. Lloyd George's Budget
of 1909 resulted in 14 Cabinet meetings and lasted right up to Budget Day,
and still there were internal Cabinet disputes when he went to the Com-
mons. The change came because Cabinet members did not want to be wor-
ried about secrets that could slip out as well as the acceptance of responsi-
3
. .
bility by the contemporary Chancellors. That this feeling exists today is
indicated by the last Labour Chancellor, Mr. Roy Jenkins, in a speech at
an American association when he stated:
Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge, England:
The University Press, 1951), p. 219.
2
Patrick Gordon Walker, The Cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape,
Ltd.
, 1970), p. 60.
3
Roy Jenkins, Asquith (London: Collins Press, 1968), p. 196.
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It is now just a little over two years since I became Chancellor
of the Exchequer in the immediate aftermath of devaluation, and
assumed primary responsibility for the management of the British
economy.
In summary, the Chancellor is a powerful figure by reason of his
position in the financial processes, by nature of the information he holds,
and by the unique relationships he holds with respect to the other members
of the Cabinet. As such a power source, he must be a target for outside
influences. How he is approached will be discussed in the next chapter.
The Role of the Cabinet
The Cabinet is the directing body of the national policy. Con-
sisting of the principal leaders of the political party in power, it
is able to forward that policy by reason of its control on the House
of Commons. Consisting, too, of the heads of the more important
Government departments, it is also able to forward its policies. ^
This statement indicates the nature of the Cabinet. It contains the most
important heads of government departments, such as the Prime Minister,
Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary, etc.
It is an executive branch of government and its members as Members of
Parliament also take part in the legislative apparatus of government. Its
reason for being is that its members, having successfully won at the last
election, now sit as a unified executive branch of the government. Finally,
its attachment to the majority party ensures its control over the House of
Commons where financial policy is legislated.
Roy Jenkins in a speech before the British American Chambers






The Cabinet may not have much voice in the shape of the Budget
on that pre -Budget day; however, since they are Ministers and Heads of
Departments they have been previously consulted by the Chancellor in his
budget formulation. The members of the Cabinet, while chosen by the
Prime Minister, originally had to campaign for their Parliament seats in
their respective constituency. In this regard, they had to gain the support
of either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party to be elected. For
this reason, some of the thoughts of their constituency must have permeated
these consultations with the Chancellor.
There is also the principle of "collective responsibility" in the
Cabinet. Walker describes this principle "that every member must accept
and if necessary defend Cabinet decisions even if he opposed and stil] dis-
likes them. " This means that, although the Chancellor is considered per-
sonally responsible for the Budget, the other Cabinet members will still be
held collectively responsible for the decisions and the subsequent outcomes
they produce. Although they have bowed to the Chancellor's wishes in the
current era, this abdication of power does not mean that they will let the
Chancellor propose a budget that is too harsh. "Further, the Cabinet can
always insist on modifications after the Budget statement has been made.





Jennings, Cabinet Government, p. 220.

46
The ministers and department heads of the Cabinet are also in
daily contact with the public in the conduct of affairs. In these day -by -day-
activities of government, consultations are prevalent.
The Federation of British Industries is consulted on all matters
affecting -industry generally, such as factory legislation, industrial
service conditions, and the like. Usually, the need for Budget
secrecy prevents consultation on proposals for taxation, but propo-
sals of a technical nature are submitted to the Council of the
Federation. *
Likewise, consultations are held with and advice sought of the General
Council of the TUC where legislation concerns employee work conditions.
Not only are consultations made, but the growth of advisory committees
has been rampant in the Twentieth Century.
These advisory committees arc "bodies attached to departments
of the Central Government in an advisory capacity, containing non -official
members, and of a standing rather than a temporary nature. " In 1958,
the TUC had representatives on 30 such organizations, while the associa-
tions that were later amalgamated to the CBI had representatives on 28
3
different committees. A review of the chairmen of such committees indi-
cates that no fewer than 1 1 of the 19 Cabinet officials had chaired commit
-
4
tees on which the TUC and CBI had representatives. Today, the number
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committees with CBI representatives. Jointly, they sit on 32 committees.
Such representation and close contacts while dealing on specialized prob-
lems may also develop a rapport towards budgetary considerations.
The Role of Parliament
i
The basic financial powers of the Parliament can be seen from the
three major principles of financial procedures:
1. All financial business is originated by the Crown alone. No
private Member may make a motion or move an amendment which
has the effect of imposing a new charge "upon the people" (taxation).
A minister acting on behalf of the Crown initiates the first stage of
every financial proposal.
2. A "charge" may only originate in the House of Commons and in
a Committee of the Whole House (Committee of Ways and Means for
Taxation)
.
3. After being voted in a Committee of the Whole House, the Reso-
lution containing a charge requires to be agreed to by the House itself
and is i.hen incorporated in a Bill, which after going through regular
stages in the House of Commons is sent to the House of Lords for the
Royal Assent.
All financial measures must be introduced by the Crown's repre-
sentatives and only they can introduce them. While this reflects the
authority of the Crown, the Parliament still has the final authority to
approve them. Additionally, the measures of revenue will be discussed in
the entire House of Commons and not in a small committee. This has the
effect that the revenue proposals will be openly discussed among all 619
Allen Campy, interview, February 25, 1971.
2
Sir Gilbert Campion, K. C. B.
,
An Introduction to the Procedures
of the House of Commons (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. , 1947), p. 259.
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members. This open discussion will mean that the majority party that
runs the government will not be able to control debate through the medium
of a special committee where they can control seats. Another element not
specifically mentioned by Campion but stated by Burkhead is "that the
Commons is free to reduce expenditure which does not reflect a loss of
confidence in the Government, yet the Commons may reject a revenue pro-
2
posal and require Cabinet to come back with an alternative. " In the debate
and amendment stage of a Finance bill, the Commons is free to act any way
seen fit except introduce another revenue proposal.
Implicit in the last principle is the supremacy of the Commons.
Although it recognizes the importance of financial legislation being intro-
duced in the Commons, it does not show the smaller role of the Lords. As
previously explained, the Parliament Act of 1911 fixed this responsibility
by negating the role of the Lords. As such, the House of Commons is the
legislative body that listens to the Budget, debates it, approves it, and
authorizes the channels for drawing in the necessary revenues. The Lords'
assent appears ritualistic and symbolic in this sense and the power of
finance is solely the responsibility of the Commons. For this reason, the
Commons alone is the reference point for budget discussions.
Besides this direct control on legislation, the composition of the
Commons provides another channel of influence by the interest groups.
Whitaker's Almanack, p. 316.
2
Burkhead, Government Budgeting, p. 5.
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This composition is in the fact that members are either Labour Party or
Conservative Party representatives. Outside of a few members affiliated
with a splinter third party --the Liberals - -the Commons is essentially a
two-party legislature. Jennings describes the nature of a two-party system
in this way:
The House of Commons is the oratorical battleground of the two
parties. The one supports and the other opposes the Government.
The one defends a policy and the other puts forward another. Any
defect of administration, any defect of practice, or any blunder of
politics is soon brought to light and exhibited to the world.
This two-party system is important to our interest groups in their
identification and support of their parties to further their aims. The labor
group of Finer is integrated into a formal affiliation with the Labour Party.
Of the 150 labor unions affiliated with the TUC, 83 are associated with the
2
Labour Party, including the Big Six. On the other side, the Conservative
Party, which is very secretive of its source of funds, is linked to the
business group. Finer calls the linkage an alignment, not an affiliation,
because it comes about through personalities not associations. He attrib-
utes this to the result of political polls by John Bonham, a review of
.3












These reasons indicate that the Commons is an excellent forum to
air the respective views of the TUC and the CBI on the Budget. The suc-
ceeding chapters will analyze these control powers and the party affiliations
to see if they help or hamper the process of influence.
Secre cy in the Budget
Equally important to the various roles of principals in the budget-
ary process is the secrecy that surrounds the budget decisions. While the
estimate of expenditures is known in February and forward projections can
determine the general totals, no one save a few knows of the detailed mea-
sures the Chancellor will propose. The secrecy preoccupation started with
Gladstone in his reluctance to give the Cabinet information on the budget
one month prior to Budget Day. The tradition was maintained and finally
legitimized by the Official Secrets Act of 1911. This Act provides for
sanctions against the release of information that is for official government
sources only. Additionally, since Civil Servants are servants of the
2Crown, they are likewise bound. The sanctions are mostly against the •
release of defense and security secrets but the economic impact of the
budget is such that the Chancellor, in delivering his speech, concerns him-
self with the over -all economic background and trends and will not start on
the measures of revenue until the clock signifies that the London Stock










Exchange is closed. This is done lest he be accused of promoting specula-
tion interest, thereby imposing the sanction of political ruin.
According to this gentleman, two ministers have resigned their
Cabinet posts, one of them a Chancellor of the Exchequer, because of viola-
tions of this principle. They had both committed the indiscretion of leaking
budget information to the wrong people at the wrong time. Both of these
resignations were in modern times. Somervell explains the cause of J. H.
Thomas, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1936:
Lloyds have for many years offered policies of insurance for
those who wish to insure against changes in taxation. In 1936,
they informed the Government that insurances in exceptionally high
sums on a change in income tax rate which had not been generally
expected had been placed, one of them immediately before the Budget
presentation. The evidence suggested the probability of leakage. A
Parliamentary tribunal was set up and found that Thomas had dis-
closed this part of the Budget after he had knowledge of it as a mem-
ber of the Cabinet. Two friends, one an M. P. , had taken out policies
on the light of the knowledge they acquired. ^
In the second case, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton,
discussed the contents of the Budget on his way to the Chamber to deliver
the speech. In his memoirs he recalls:
On my way to the Chamber to make my Budget speech, I had
had a few words with John Carvel, the Star's Lobby correspondent,
about the contents of my Budget. While I was on the floor deliver-
ing the speech, the newspaper, an afternoon daily, was already on
the street.
A. Clift, First Secretary, Economic Division, interview held at
the British Embassy, Washington, D. C.
,
on February 24, 1971.
2 "
'
D. C. Somervell, British Politics Since 1900 (London: Andrew
Dankers, Ltd., 1950), pp. 205-206.
3
Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After (London: Frederick Muller,
Ltd.
, 1962), p. 277.
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In tendering his resignation, he had ended a short, successful career which
began with a balanced budget in April, 1947. The budget that caused his
demise was the autumn budget, a supplemental to the yearly one to deal
with extraordinary events.
The element of secrecy has come into disfavor from many quarters,
Lord Fulton, the Chairman of the Civil Service Committee, indicated his
committee's criticism:
We think that the administrative process is surrounded by too
much secrecy. The public interest would be better served if there
were, a greater amount of openness. The increasingly wide range
of problems handled by government and their far-reaching effects
upon the community as a whole demand the widest possible consul-
tations with its different parts or interests.
Other political writers, such as John Mackintosh, have suggested other
alternatives such as a Committee on Taxation within the House of Commons
that could conduct a total review continually during the year, which would
negate "secrets. "
Secrecy in budgeting is still prevalent and as such must be consid-
ered a hindrance to interest groups. It does not provide them feedback on
their requests until after the speech has been made. It does not afford
them the opportunity to provide the right type of "information" to counter
some of the Chancellor's choices. Finally, it restricts the Chancellor's
Report of the Committee on the Civil Service (London: Her Maj-
esty's Stationery Office, 1968), CMND 3638, p. .91.
' 2
John Mackintosh, M. P. , "The House of Commons and Taxation, "
Political Quarterly, January-March, 1971, p. 84.
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possible .alternatives to the recommendations of this Budget Committee and
not to the public interest at large. Nevertheless, interest groups must
bridge this gap as well as correctly assess the role of the principal actors
to achieve their ends.

CHAPTER III
METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF INFLUENCE
Having spoken of the budgetary process and identified the principal
"official" actors, it is now necessary to discuss the various methods, tech-
niques, and procedures that the two interest groups use to secure their ends
The procedures may be of a long-run variety or of a short -run, ranging
froin deputations to the formal presentations of their wants and desires. In
one instance there is also a definite relationship pattern which may affect




Reference has been made in Chapter II to the affiliation of the TUC
to the Labour Party. This affiliation was not automatically created in 1868
on the day of the TUC's inception. Attempts from that time until 1899 were
to no avail and, finally, the TUC accepted the proposal of discussing spon-
sorship of Members of Parliament. The Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants introduced a resolution at the annual TUC conference:
To invite the cooperation of all the cooperative, socialistic,
trade unions and other working class organizations to jointly coop-
erate on lines mutually agreed upon in convening a special congress




may be willing to take part to devise ways and means for securing
the return of an increased number of labour members to the next
Parliament. *
The fathering of the Labour Party was the start of the association and its
growth was slow but steady. The sponsorship was being criticized by the
Unionist and the Liberal parties, but the TUC had only agreed to the spon-
sorship by_ the individual unions, so political intervention was, in fact,
implemented by the member unions. In 1910, the Osborne Judgment came
from the courts nullifying mandatory fund-raising by the unions, and it was
Z
not until the Trades Union Act of 1913 that sponsorship was legitimized.
This Act provided that "before a union may spend any money to further
political objectives it must secure the approvals of its members, through
ballot, to set up a separate political fund. Additionally, there is relief for
3
dissenters. "
This same principle is prevalent today. Yet again, the TUC does
not sponsor members for Parliament; rather, it supports the sponsorship
by its member unions. According to Pelling, about 6. 5 million trade union
members were involved in the Parliamentary Labour Party, through
Ivor Bulmer -Thomas, The Growth of the British Party System
(London: John Baker Publishers, Ltd., 1945), ~Vol. I, p. 173.
2
Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party (London:
Macmillan & Co. , Ltd. , 1968), pp. 19-23.
3
Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the. Labour Party Since 1945
(London: George Allen &; Unwin, Ltd., I960), p. 23.
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affiliation and support by political levy. Table 5 presents an indication
of the trends in sponsorship of Members for Parliament. This table indi-
cates that over one -third of the Labour Members of Parliament are spon-
sored members.
Sponsorship of members to sit in Parliament was not only a means
to satisfy an interest group's demands for better repr esentation, but it was
also a means to satisfy a livelihood for the Member of Parliament. Outside
financial support was necessary since the payment of Members of Parlia-
ment was not authorized until the Parliament Act of 1911. Until the sixties,
the need for financial support was still present, and even then the official
salary does not cover all expenses but rather permits the Member to declare
-• r r 2income tax relief for expenses.
Labour Party sponsored members, on the other hand, are not only
helped with maintenance grants and election expenses at the local level, but,
according to Harrison, some unions provide their Parliamentary spokesmen
3
with offices, secretarial, and research facilities
,
postage, and stationery.





Vol. 103, p. 307.
3
Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labor Party Since 1945
, p. 92.
The only rule governing maintenance expenses and election expenses is
under the Hastings Agreement of the Labour Party Conference, 1933. This
allows a maximum grant of 350 pounds for boroughs and 420 pounds for
county. Election expenses coverage is allowed up to 80 per cent of total





TRADE UNION SPONSORED MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
1966 Election
Union
National Union of Mineworkers . . .
Transport and General Workers Union . „
National Union of Railwaymen
Transport Salaried Staffs Association „
National Union of General and Municipal Workers .
Union of Shop, Distribution and Allied Workers . .
British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades Association
United Textile Factory Workers Association ....
Amalgamated Engineering Union . „
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and
Firemen
Union of Post Office Workers
National Union of Agricultural Workers
Electrical Trades Union
Others
Total Trade Union Members of Parliament
Total Labour Members of Parliament . . .
Total Conservative Members of Parliament























Past Elections and Percentages
1945 120 sponsored of 393 total Labour
1950 Ill sponsored of 315
1951 108 sponsored of 295
1955 95 sponsored of 277
1959 ...... 92 sponsored of 258







Source: David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts, 1900
1967 (London: Macmillan & Co. , Ltd., 1968), p. 110.
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Outside of the rules laid down by the Hastings Agreement, there are no estab-
lished limits for other assistance nor are there legal restrictions put down by
the Government. Stewart confirms this in his book in equating these measures
to the American term "lobbying. M
The procedures of lobbying are not restricted by any special laws
in the country. There have been occasions when the lobbyist has found
himself in a breach of privileges case but for the most part he is in no
such danger. *
This may appear to reflect that only trades unions are involved in
sponsorship; however, Finer has also suggested that the business interests
are also aligned to a political party. He is not the only author to state that
some relationship exists between the business interests and the Parliament
Members.
It is an open secret that, while on one side the trade unions pay
Parliarr entary allowances, on the other, great industrial concerns
also subsidize Members to represent their interests, usually by
appointing them to directorships in corporations.
Moreover, a TUC spokesman stated last year that 433 firms contributed
over a million pounds to the Conservative Party, presumably to finance
3
elections. Potter also identifies the relationship by the contributory
aspect:
Stewart, British Pressure Groups
, p. 220.
2
Strathearn Gordon, Our Parliament (London: Cassell &: Co. , Ltd. ,
1964), p. 52.
3The Times (London), October 29, 1970, p. 24.
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The business community contributes heavily to the Party funds,
with the result that the Conservative organization is much wealthier
and more fully staffed than its Labour counterpart. During general
elections large advertisers release poster space for the use of
Conservatives only. *
The CBI is silent on this aspect and the point was never fully explored in the
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations mentioned
earlier.
Given that there is a sponsorship of Members of Parliament either
directly or covertly by the groups, how does this affect the budgetary deci-
sions ? First, the member who has particular interests to serve will strive
to affect legislation accordingly. Unless the member is a part of the Cabi-
net, he will not be privy to the budget secrets until announced on the floor
of the Commons; yet he may help influence the amendment stage to support
or dampen revenue measures, depending on the interests he serves.
Secondly, all members of the government are also Members of
Parliament; consequently, the sponsored members will have access to
these government officials on a daily basis, thereby supplementing the inter-
ests' direct consultation. In this manner, he will be able to maintain a
continuous form of influence before the budget as well as after the budget.
If nothing else, his influence can be strictly of the informational variety
which might assist the government's development of fiscal policy.
Thirdly, the sponsored member can help create a wider public
forum on certain programs by his membership in the august body. The
Allen Potter, Organized Groups in British National Politics
(London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1961), p. 298.
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business of the Commons is not ail government business, and private mem-
bers have times allotted to offer comments on the debates, ask oral ques-
tions of the governmental ministers, and present written questions to be
answered in another session. If the member is of the same party as the
government, clarifications can be asked to satisfy interests or concessions
may be granted within the confines of party caucus on extremely controver-
sial items.
This aspect of sponsorship appears to be quite a factor on the
political scene; however, Campy stated that the extent and failure to dis-
close relative facts pertinent to financial backing is not as drastic as it
appears. While there may be some cases of heavy political spending and
backing of parliamentary candidates, this does not imply a total abuse or
disregard Oj. the conventions of Parliament. There is the tacit understand-
ing that any group backing a member cannot coerce that member, for it
would be a breach of the privileges of Commons. In all respects, the
Member of Parliament is considered a representative, not a delegate; and,
therefore, he must act accordingly. On speaking of any items, each mem-
ber is expected to disclose any personal financial backing that he may have.
While there are no strict laws to insure this practice, the unwritten conven-
tions and the sanctions such as expulsion on matters of privilege preclude
any abuses.
A. Campy, interview, February 25, 1971.
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This unwritten convention is also significant enough in the minds of
Parliament as a body. In 1967 a Labour Member of Parliament introduced
a bill that provided for a public register of all outside monies and services
received by the Members from outside sources. The opponents voted it
down overwhelmingly for they felt that it was unnecessary to establish a
written law when in fact an accepted principle already existed. As a col-
lective body, they saw that there is nothing disreputable about personal
connections and outside of a few cases, no abuses were apparent.
The Advisory Committees
Besides the use of sponsored members, there is another continual
opportunity for the interest groups to make their position known. The
device used here is the advisory commiltee. Both interest groups are
heavily represented on the major ones, as indicated previously. Some of
these are shown in Table 6, the three most important being the National
Economic Development Council, the. National Production Advisory Council
on Industry, and the National Joint Advisory Council.
The National Economic Development Council (NEDC) was formally
set up in 1962 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. Besides the
representatives of the CBI and TUC, there are other Cabinet ministers
present or their representatives, such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
the President of the Board of Trade, and the Secretary of State for Employ-
ment and Productivity. Its primary function is to discuss the future policy




MAJOR ADVISORY COMMITTEES WITH TUC
AND CBI MEMBERSHIP
Committee Purpose
National Economic Development Council*
National Production Advisory Council on
Industry
National Joint Advisory Council
Consultative Committee for Industry
Engineering Advisory Council
National Insurance Advisory Committee
Central Housing Advisory Committee
A forum on policy and plan-
ning for economy.
A forum to discuss over -all
production difficulties
A forum for discussion of
employer -labour problems
A forum for discussions on
British Trade
A forum to discuss
engineering problems in
that particular industry
A forum to discuss the
areas of unemployment
A forum to discuss the
implications of the housing
industry in Great Britain
A forum to discuss methods
of increasing productivity
British Productivity Council
*New organization set up in 1962. See text for source of information
Source: Political and Economic Planning, Advisory Committees in British
Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , I960), pp.
132-185.
and planning of the economy. Its major sources of information are provided
by the Economic Development Committees, which are committees that
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produce annual reports from the 21 major manufacturing and service indus-
tries. As such, the Council has monthly meetings and the agenda is set up
locally by the Council and not imposed by government.
In opening up the first organizational meeting, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd, described the reasons for its development:
I believe that the time has come to establish new and more
effective machinery for the coordination of plans and forecasts for
the main sectors of the economy. There is a need to study cen-
trally the plans and prospects of our main industries, to correlate
them with each other and with the Government's plans for the public
sector, and to see how in the aggregate they contribute to, and fit
in with, the prospects for the economy as a whole, including the
vital Balance of Payments.
Its importance can be seen from the description by the TUC in its written
evidence:
The establishment of much closer relationships with the gov-
ernment and the achievement of a greater degree of influence over
government policies has been illustrated and symbolized by the
establishment of the NEDC. This importance is because it is
representative, it meets regularly, and it deals with specific issues.
The National Production Advisory Council on Industry (NPACI)
was instituted in August, 1942. Although the functions at the time revolved
around war-time production and difficulties, its usage in modern times is
still concerned with the investigation of production difficulties. Its terms




3 Trades Union Congress, Trade Unionism, p. 9.
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of reference involve all aspects of industrial policy except wages and condi-
tions of employment. As is true of most other committees, there is equal
representation of the CBI and TUC, being nine each. Originally under the
Treasury and the Chancellor, it has been put under the Board of Trade for
responsibility. The chairmanship is still the Chancellor, but four other
Cabinet ministers are present—namely, Agriculture, Transport, Paymaster
General, and the Board of Trade. While held in quarterly sessions, there
have been occasions for more frequent meetings. The importance of this
committee to the interest groups is evidenced by the procedural matters it
discusses. The opening remarks are by the Chancellor concerning the
economy and information of this nature is conducive to budget proposals.
The National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC) was established in
1939. Its functions center on the promulgation of advice for the government
on all matters that affect employers and working people. The discussions
are general and touch upon every facet of labor matters. As a forum in the
Cabinet level of government, both business and union leaders have the oppor-
tunity to discuss the Treasury Economic Bulletin , a quarterly issue that
serves as a point of departure. Notable among the Government's represen-
tatives are the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity and
Treasury representatives, including the Chancellor eit times. Both the TUC
and the CBI have seventeen members along with the government membership.




Ol importance is that quarterly meetings are set up for January, April,
July, and October, which would allow for definite inputs regarding eco-
nomic aspects of the budget. Of no less importance are the informal
contacts that both groups can nurture in this large setting.
The use of advisory committees has special meaning for the TUC
and CBI. Of the benefits, the most readily apparent one is the open discus-
sion in a forum of ideas that may assist the Chancellor in picking the best
of economic alternatives open to him in shaping budgetary policy. This best
alternative is that which is considered best to the interest group. Not only
does the discussion help the Chancellor or Treasury representatives see the
TUC and CBI viewpoints
,
but it also helps the government accumulate much
technical and expert information. Thirdly, the personal contacts established
in such an environment may also lend weight to the development of a credit-
able rapport between the groups and the government. Notwithstanding the
probability that the Chancellor has already made up his mind, the influx of
new ideas, collectively established, may have influence on the budgetary
decisions that follow.
The Use of Representations
While the preceding two forms of influence may be considered a
continuing injection into the budgetary process, there is the direct approach






are relatively new developments in the influencing process on budgets.
The TUC originated its annual TUC Economic Review in 1966 in order to
present a concise, complete picture of their desires in one document. It
is a compilation of all issues previously brought to the government's cog-
nizance on a piecemeal basis. The CBI instituted this idea two years later
2
in 1968. These documents present in a unified form the proposals they
wish to see enacted in the forthcoming budget. The timing of their submis-
sion is often predicated by the conditions of the economy as well as the
advance announcement by the Chancellor regarding his budget submission
to the Commons.
For the 1970-71 Budget, the Chancellor received the deputation
and Economic Review on January 28, 1970, almost two and one-half months
before his speech on April 14. On that day, representatives delivered the
basic specifics of their proposals, posed for pictures, but failed to elicit
3
any promises from the Chancellor. The booklet containing the proposals
was then published in March, 1970, for general consumption. On the other
hand, the CBI published their booklet in February, 1970, and formally met
with the Chancellor on February 7 to discuss their representations. On
TUC Report 1969, Report of the 101st Annual Trades Union
Congress held in Portsmouth, England, September 1-5, 1969 (London:
Cooperative Printing Society, 1969), p. 419.
2CBI letter of March 23, 1971.
3The Times (London), January 29, 1970, p. 21.
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this day, the CBI requested a general relaxation of monetary pressures on
companies' finances and the encouragement of a policy to further industrial
investment.
The importance of these documents can be ascertained by their
contents and the specific representations for 1970 are a representative
model. The TUC budget paper contained six chapters in its 67 pages. The
first chapter represented their over -all forecast for the economy, using
trend and statistical data for supporting evidence. This chapter is devised
to be a picture of the economy with its limitations and potentials. It also
presented the general over -all scope of the Balance of Payments problems
as seen by the TUC. Chapters II and III were considered to be the major
areas of government concern, as seen by the TUC. In this instance, they
were the employment situation and productivity, as well as the effects of
large firms and mergers. Chapter IV dspicted the international company
problems and their encroachment on the United Kingdom, as well as the
implications for the British industry. Chapter V was a discussion on labor
unions' favorite topic --the collective bargaining jungle. In this chapter,
the TUC presented inadequacies of the present system and was apparently
"lobbying" for reforms rather than budgetary legislation. The sixth chap-
ter dealt with specifics of the taxation proposals they desired. In addition,
it provided the rationale for such proposals within the fiscal policy they
The Times (London), February 8, 1970, p. 19.
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advocate. The proposals are not only directed at the main target, the
Chancellor, but also at the public at large in bookstores at three shillings
a copy (36 cents).
The CBI document was of a different nature in that its three sections
were made up of 52 pages and cost the interested buyer seventeen shillings
(approximately $2. 00). It started with an economic survey chapter much
broader in scope than the TUC counterpart, but lacking the graphic and
tabular data of the TUC. The second chapter, entitled "General Representa-
tions, " outlines the major proposals that the CBI wishes to be enacted.
Together with specific recommendations on specific taxes, it outlined also
the major areas for future consideration. It also pointed out some of the
similarities between itself and its employee counterpart by highlighting the
personal income taxes as one of its goals. The third chapter, entitled
"Technical Representations," was directed to proposals for its small busi-
ness firms' benefit. This section pinpointed the responsibility of the CBI
to all of its affiliated and associated members. Of importance, national-
ized industries were not specifically mentioned, but the second chapter
presumably covered their wants and desires. An interesting appendix was
also presented in that past representations that had not been enacted were
2
being resubmitted for consideration.
Trades Union Congress, Economic Review (London: Victoria
Printing Company, 1970), pp. 5-67.
Z
Confederation of British Industry, The Budget 1970: CBI
Representations to the Chancellor (London: Metcalf Cooper & Hepburn,
Ltd. , 1970), pp. 1-52.
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Each group's representations are an important input into the
budgetary process and although there are differences in the style and format,
they are submitted for the same purpose: to convince the Chancellor of
their point of view. Additionally, they provide a channel of communication
not only to their membership, but also to the public at large through their
sales of the individual representations. The relative importance of the
documents was highlighted by Clift in the interview on February 25. He
stated that the representations arrive at a point of time when the best of
the alternatives open to the Chancellor have not been selected. To his
understanding, the Chancellor does review them and especially their sup-
porting evidence. This is especially true since the Treasury and Chancel-
lor have been bombarded by individual interest groups, especially some of
the affiliated members of the TUC and CBI. Clift made the conjecture
from his experience at Whitehall that the Chancellor had the opportunity to
place many of these individual demands in the context of the over -all TUC
and CBI demands, thereby leading to a better over -all assessment of what
the economy needs. Of primary importance, though, was that the Chancel-
lor or any other member of the Treasury or Revenue Departments does not
make any commitment or jeopardize the secrecy factor of the budgetary
process. In this way, the integrity of the Budget is maintained.




The TUC also employs its annual conference as a possible influence-
seeking mechanism in the budgetary process. In September of every year the
TUC meets at a resort area—usually Brighton, Portsmouth, or Blackpool--
where the annual election of the General Council is conducted. Moreover, it
is an effort to bring together the representatives of the different industry
groupings for policy discussions. It also presents the major opportunity to
present their image to the public at large. Finally, because of the allegiance
and support of the Labour Party, many labor Members of Parliament, and,
if this party is the majority party, many government officials attend the ses-
sions. There presents no better opportunity for a mass onslaught on public
opinion than the annual conferences.
In 1969, for example, six months before the 1970 Budget, the news-
paper coverage carried full -page spreads of the activities, even if the news-
paper had a traditional political leaning toward the Conservatives. On the
fifth day of the conference, the specific aims of the TUC on budget matters
are put forward and espoused as planks for the Labour Party to follow. Here,
then, is the specific effort by the TUC to air its proposals publicly. This
A review of the newspapers on file at the British Embassy showed
that the major newspapers of England carried two- or three -page writeups
regarding the resolutions presented, the speeches, and the policy develop-
ments. A daily summary sheet prepared by the British Information Service
regarding major editorial remarks provided the information on political lean-
ings of the newspapers. For example, T he Times (London) - Independent;
The Financial Times - Independent; The Daily Mirror , Daily Sketch, and The




recurring conference highlights the direction that the TUC will pursue in
the forthcoming pressures on the Budget.
The CBI, on the other hand, does not have an annual conference.
When John Davies resigned as Director General of the CBI in 1970, the
Economist prepared an analysis of his tenure and the CBI in general. The
article deals with the relative voice of the "backwoodsmen" of the CBI (the
small member firms) and their over -all relation to the organization:
It was to give the backwoodsmen some sort of platform for their
views that the idea of an annual CBI Congress was voted some time
back. The plan never got farther than the leak -happy front pages of
the heavier Sunday newspapers, chiefly because some of the bigger
voices feared the public responses to the public airing of the sup-
posedly reactionary and ill-informed views of the small industrialist.
Mr. Davies indicated in the same article that the voice of the
smaller industrialist was being heard by the CBI within the organization;
however, he felt that the CBI itself was unproductive towards their demands.
In striving for better consultation with the government, the organization had
not looked at this internal situation. This preoccupation with the external
environment could be resolved under conditions of a Conservative govern-
2
ment rather than a Labour government.
On the other hand, the CBI does provide an instrument that com-
mands some attention. The Industrial Trends Survey is published three
times annually, in February, June, and October. This document represents
Economist
,






a statistical attitude survey based on a questionnaire sent to firms that
represent over 2. 5 million employees. As a planning document, it high-
lights only one aspect of the economy-
-namely, levels of corporate spend-
ing and forecasts for future investment. It does not deal with any specific
recommendations, nor does it touch upon proposals for personal consump-
tion. However, the factual data presented do lend themselves to Treasury
consideration of the areas of corporation taxation and investment credits.
According to Clift, the other avenues open to possible influence on
the Budget are the use of deputations and memoranda. The deputations
arise out of the close contacts with the groups in the myriad advisory com-
mittees, as well as the day-to-day contact the various departments maintain
with both organizations. These deputations take the form of public announce-
ments, suc'i as the formal TUC or CBI meetings in January or February,
or they can take the social aspect of contacts at lunch or dinner. In most
instances, the deputations are by individual trade union leaders acting on
behest of their individual national union working for some special concession
and not a general over -all economic plan. On the other hand, the TUC or
CBI organized deputations use these occasions to relate to the entire econ-
omy and it sometimes appears that they ask for ten objectives, hoping to
achieve at least five. The organized deputations are encouraged by the
Treasury personnel and ministers for they provide information and a channel
The Times (London), October 17, 1969, p. 26.
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for measuring the public pulse. Using the Budget of 1970 as an example
to collaborate this point, the Times reported seven TUC deputations and
2
five. CBI deputations in the period September 1969 to February 1970. Such
deputations included the individual meetings with the Chancellor, the
President of the Board of Trade, the Secretary of State for Employment and
Productivity, and the Prime Minister.
Memoranda are also a powerful form of influence from these two
organizations. Although not consistently used, such memoranda issued by
these organizations tend to be lengthy, descriptive, and laden with statis-
tics. These memoranda are used primarily in the autumn and winter when
they are considered to have the most impact and the official "representa-
tions" serve as a summary of the memoranda. The memoranda are not a
mass form of lobbying, but are carefully planned strategies to win over the
Chancellor and the Treasury. They are released only infrequently because
such usage would dampen their impact upon the recipients. Indeed, in
Great Britain, the TUC and CBI have achieved a stature of prestige and
they enjoy a good relationship between the government and themselves.
Clift felt this prestige is attributed to the size of their interests, the formal
methods of presentation, and the expert technical advice they can give gov-
ernment. Consequently, any form of influencing government appears to be
Clift, interview, February 25, 1971.
2
The Times (London), September 1, 1969, to February 15, 1970.

74
done in a responsible manner.
These interest groups use a variety of methods to influence the
budgetary process. In an expanding economy such as Great Britain, the
interest groups use both traditional methods and non -traditional methods
to achieve their ends, yet they do not go to the extent that exists in America.
Finer describes the role of interest groups in Great Britain as a domesti-
cated system:
It works more closely with government departments, and is
more closely tied in with the legislative than its counterpart in
America. It acts much more soberly and responsibly. And, once
aligned with or encapsulated in a party, as they are, it can allow
its cause to go forward in the normal course of party politics
without needing to draw up support from the outside. The role of
the American interest group is forced into a public campaign for
an American party programme can hardly be said to exist. a
Clift, interview, February 25, 1971.




There are a few possible ways to make an assessment of the
effectiveness of the TUC and CBI in securing official recognition of their
budgetary goals. One such way would be to compile public speeches and
pronouncements of the leading officials of both groups after the Budget
Speech. Such a method would not be conducive by itself because these
public utterances would only reflect outcomes and not develop relationships
between cause and effect. As another result, only successes might be high-
lighted and the failures which might have had higher priority would be toned
down. These leaders, after all, would want to retain their leader ship so
they would only promote their gains. A second method could be to examine
the official pronouncements by the government- -i. e.
,
through the Chancel-
lor - -but this might be mere lip service to the usefulness of these interest
groups. In addition, it would not focus on the nature of the economy that
necessitates some budgetary decisions and not others. A third alternative
is to examine in brief the nature of the economy, what alternatives are
possible, and compare the "representations" with the actual budget propo-
sals. In addition, the examination should also consider the final Finance




of the government as mitigated by legislative approval can present a clearer
picture of the usefulness of the two interest groups. In developing this anal-
ysis, some attention will be given to the first two methods to complete the
picture; however, the objective analysis will be the major theme. As a
result of the analysis, some generalizations will become evident despite the
usage of only one budget to illustrate indications of responsiveness to interest
groups' desires.
Background to the Budget
It has been pointed out in Chapter II that the TUC and CBI operate
somewhat in a vacuum in relation to the government on budgetary matters.
This aspect is primarily ascribed to the secrecy that surrounds the Budget.
While the details are shrouded in secrecy, there are some indications of
possible alternatives open to the Chance'.lor. The conditions of the economy
and statements published shed some light on these possible alternatives.
First, the Chancellor outlined one of the major priorities in
January, 1970:
In an interview, the Chancellor reaffirms the need for a five
hundred million pound basic balance of payments surplus over twelve
months to meet short-term debt and to withstand any future world
trading difficulties. Such a surplus will enable Great Britain to meet
her commitments. (International Monetary Fund loan)
This first priority indicates that the balance of payments is over and above
the major domestic needs of lower taxation across the board. To meet this
Hugh Stephenson, "Jenkins Hard Line on Economy, " The Times
(London), January 6, 1970, p. 22.
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priority, import restraint was essential and tight fiscal and monetary mea-
sures would have to be continued to keep down the total real production and
demand in Great Britain. This total real demand and production had
already been kept down to a 1.5 per cent growth during 1969.
Faced with this priority, the economy was also experiencing spiral-
ing wages and rising inflation:
During Summer 1969, Britain's monthly earnings index was
8 per cent higher than a year before and since October of that year,
high wage increases had pushed the annual rate still higher. The
end result is that Britain is stuck on a situation where costs per
unit of output are rising by rather more than 6 per cent per annum.
Real demand might have been kept down, but there was a rampant inflation
in Great Britain that affected the economy.
Faced with this situation, the economic sections of both the TUC
and the CBI must have realized that there could be no major push for broad
and deep tax cuts. Such cuts would have the effect of putting more money
into the hands of the consumer and price inflation would be high. Additionally,
with a slump in production and the high unemployment, another alternative
was open to Mr. Jenkins to cut the corporation tax levy, thereby stimulating
business investment. Such a stimulant might then relieve the unemployment
picture and rekindle hiring. As the plants expanded with investment, more
and more people who had been made redundant (laid off) would be called back
to work. Within the maintenance of a favorable balance of payments posture,
Economist
,





Great Britain had to produce and raise its productivity above 1. 5 per cent
annual growth to meet external demands.
A third possible alternative was to combine reductions in both per
sonal income and business taxes to some degree that would only be a tem-
porary relief to all concerned. The people of Great Britain had become
weary of the taxation question during Labour rule:
Its budgets and quasi-budgets had increased tax rates since 1964
by two and one -half billion pounds a year and with the rise in prices
and tax yields, has combined to double tax revenues between 1964 and
1970. The proportionate rise in money and national income has been
less than half as large. *
In January, 1970, the TUC and CBI had a gloomy picture before
them, and to them fell the task of convincing the Chancellor the need for a
restimulation of the domestic economy. Faced with the Chancellor's pub-
lished priority and its consequent repercussions of a tight fiscal budget,
they had to choose a compatible list of proposals. Based on this picture of
the economy as a whole, the Economist was predicting taxation relief of
2
less than one hundred million pounds in toto.
The TUC and CBI
Re presentations
In its representation, the TUC sought a need for expansion based
on the strength of the Balance of Payments position. Consequently, they
proposed a reflationary programme with regard to:
Economist
,






1. Social and economic priorities, including priorities in
redistribution of incomes.
2. Import content and effects on export competitiveness.
3. Sectors with under -employ ed equipment and manpower.
In this way they hoped to convey the need for an increase in demand at home
as well as an increase in real income as high as the growth of the national
income.
To accomplish these ends, they proposed the following specific
proposals, as summarized in Table 7. It is apparent that they did not see
the economic situation as being affected by any lack of investment opportu-
nities or hampered by any need of tight fiscal policy. Their position on the
Corporation Tax signified their adherence to the 45 per cent level established
by the Finance Act of 1969. As expected, most of their proposals were
geared toward the industrial wage earner in order to give him more purchas-
ing power and stimulate domestic demand. Additionally, their position on
investment incentives was to increase the differentiation of tax treatment
between earned and unearned income. Apparently, they felt that the unearned
income was commanding too much of the total income of Great Britain;
therefore, they were appealing for a more progressive tax on income realized
from investments. This same feeling permeated their request that Estate
Duty be maintained at the current level. According to the TUC estimates,




SPECIFIC BUDGET PROPOSALS BY THE TUC
Type Category Affected Proposal
Income Tax Single persons Raise income base allowance
from 300 to 555 pounds
Married couples (husband 340 pounds to 482 pounds
only working)
Married couple, 1 child 500 pounds to 857 pounds
Family Families with children Increase allowance 30 shillings
Allowances for each child from age 11
Negative All low-paid and unem- To introduce a plan of negative
Income Tax ployed income tax set at some level
Local Author - All persons Development of a scheme based
ity Taxes on progressive rather than
(Rates) regressive principles
Value Added All persons No VAT be introduced; rs.ther,
Tax (VAT) keep Purchase Tax
Selective All employers Request rollback of the 28-1/2
Employment per cent increase in budget of
Tax (SET) 1969
Corporation All corporations, both on Maintenance of same
Tax profits and capital gains
Estate Duty All persons Maintain current level
Investment All industries and investors Increase differentiation between
Incentives tax treatment of earned and
unearned income
Source: Trades Union Congress, Economic. Review, 1970, pp. 57-67.

their proposals would net taxation relief of around 400 million pounds.
The CBI saw a re stimulation of the economy also predicated on
the Balance of Payments posture but more on the better balancing of fiscal
and monetary policy. They felt that the stringent monetary management
had been too harsh on industry and it was superimposed on a severe fiscal
policy. They concluded that the monetary control should be exercised less
2
through hire purchase and bank credit restrictions and more through inter
est rate manipulation and government borrowing. They also felt that the
trend in the balance of payments surplus would continue and that it was
time to stimulate domestic spending through cuts in taxation. These cuts
should consider the corporate levels, then personal levels. A summary of
their proposals appears in Table 8.
The CBI proposals presented a completely opposite view to those
of the TUC. Their proposals, as expected, were aligned to the business
community. As such, these proponents of the free enterprise system
wanted tax benefits for the employers and, it seemed, for the wealthier
proportion of the economy --i. e.
, the capital gains and corporation tax.
Of more importance are their proposals on the income tax. Not only did
The Times (London), January 29, 1970, p. 26.
2
Hire purchase restrictions are those that are laid down by the
government (through the Board of Trade) on installment buying. These
restrictions apply to the term of the installment contract and the amount
of money for deposit. For cars, as an example, 40 per cent must be put
down and the balance paid within 24 months. As a result, in an economy
like Britain, the effect is to forestall buying and thereby cutting home
demand. B. I. S. Information 95/68, British Embassy, November 4, 1968.

TABLE 8
SPECIFIC BUDGET PROPOSALS BY THE CBI
Type Category Affected Proposal
Capital Gains All persons and corporations Reduction of the 30% charge or
Tax exemption for persons holding
assets for a long period of
time
Estate Duty All persons Reduction by one -half the cur-
rent rate of 25-8 5% of varying
increments of estate.
Interest All persons Repeal of the disallowance of
interest as a deduction for tax
persons
Income Tax All persons No surtax on income less than
(Surtax) 5, 000 pounds
Income Tax All persons Reduction on broad -based rate
(Basic) by 6 pence in the pound
Corporation All corporations Reduced to 4Z-1/Z per cent
Tax
Investment All industries and investors Investment grants payments
Incentives reduced from one year to six
month period. Increase in
investment allowance.
Selective All employers Abolishment
Employment
Tax
Source: The Budg et , 1970: CBI Representations to the Chancellor
(London:^
-
Metcalf Cooper & Hepburn, Ltd., 1970), pp. 8-37.
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they propose an increase in the base before the surtax was applicable, but
also a general reduction in the basic income tax. Contrasted to the TUC
proposals which were attuned to the lower paid people, the CBI recom-
mended across-the-board cuts. Additionally, heavy emphasis was placed
on the investment incentives in order to spur the economy through increased
production. It was not surprising then that their proposals would net taxa-
tion relief of over 800 million pounds, as indicated by the Times.
The Budget Speech
On April 14, 1970, Chancellor Roy Jenkins delivered his speech to
the House of Commons. There were mixed reactions from the TUC and the
CBI. Speaking of the Finance Bill introduced by the Chancellor, Victor
Feather, General Secretary of the TUC, said that the Budget was:
. . „ a solid, sound, and sober springboard on which progress could
be made after two years of hard slog. The TUC had not expected
more in total but it would have liked to see a more selective
approach.
Sir Arthur Norman, President of the CBI, welcomed the limited changes
which help the industry with its liquidity problem; however, he said, "the
Budget does not provide a substantial encouragement to savings and invest-
ment. "
After the hue and cry of a restrictive Budget by the opposition
Conservative Party, the Financial Statement was presented, which detailed
The Times (London), February 8, 1970, p. 19.
2
The Times (London), April 15, 1970, p. 21. Ibid.
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the Budget decisions. Table 9 summarizes these decisions. From its
appearances, it seems like an empty budget, something for some people
but not totally comprehensive in its scope. The press was critical, and
the Economist saw it as a neutral object:
Budget week in an election year is as good a time as any to dis-
cern the Government's political strategy. Mr. Jenkins' most
devoted admirers will dispute that. They will argue that the Chan-
cellor had no political considerations in mind in framing his Budget.
Others will not have the strength of imagination to encompass the
thought that two such highly political animals as Mr. Jenkins and
Mr. Wilson would settle for a Budget which was designed to be no
better than politically neutral. Yet both views could be right,
because neutrality is now so much the British way of political life.
A review of the proposed changes indicates that the journal was right. On
the income tax side, some relief was given to the lower paid and the aged
on the other end. For business interests, he provided the investment ini-
tiative despite its short two-year term of life. Estate duties were raised
only 1 per cent on the interest which could not offend the TUC nor was it
so excessive to anger the CBI. Surtax was not mentioned by the TUC, but,
according to the CBI, it did provide a small amount of relief. Yet, this
relatively neutral Budget had to pass the test of the Commons, and the
question remained whether sympathetic Members of Parliament let the
Chancellor escape with a 180-million -pound tax relief.






Type Category Affected Proposal
Income Tax Married (husband working) Allowance from 37 5 pounds
to 465 pounds
Aged over 65 years old Taxable income from 425
(single) pounds to 475 pounds
Single and divorced women Additional personal 100-
pound allowance
Surtax All persons No surtax under 2, 500 -pound
income
Investment All employers Northern Ireland- -allowance
Credit for capital expenditure in-
creased from 15 to 40%. All
other areas, from 15 to 30%.
Expenditure incurred after
April 5, 1970, and before:
April 6, .1972.
Estate Duty- All persons Increase the rate of interest
on duty from 2 to 3%
Stamp All persons Abolish the 2 -pence duty on
Duties bills of exchange.
Source: Finan cial Statement and Budget Report, 1970-1971 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), pp. 26-29.
The Budget in the
House of Commons
Outside of his regular presentation of the annex to the Budget that
listed the changes to taxation, the Chancellor did include another element
that must have been designed to placate the CBI and the business interests.
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In his words, he announced that the favorable trade balances had indicated
that the
. . .
requirements of domestic policy do not oblige us to hold the
Bank Rate at 7. 5 per cent. With my approval, therefore, the Bank
of England is reducing the Bank Rate to 7 per cent with effect
tomorrow.
With these remarks, the Provisional Collection of Taxes required resolution
was passed and debate carried over.
According to the official minutes of Parliamentary Debates
, the
entire discussion from Budget Speech to passage of the Finance Act lasted
from April 14 until May 27 in chronological sequence; yet, the total discus-
sion, resolutions, amendment considerations, debate, and three readings
lasted only eight sessions. These were not even full sessions, since pri-
vate member bills, recesses for holidays, and answers for oral questions
on other bills took up some of the time. A review of the eight sessions
indicated a total lapsed time of about 43 hours.
After the Budget Speech, the general economic discussions lasted
the first four sessions, and the discussions went back and forth between the
House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Vol. 799, Issue 825, April 10,
16, 1970, par. 1236. According to John H. Kareken's "Monetary Policy"
in Britain's Econom ic. Prospect, edited by Richard E. Caves &; Associates
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 69, the Bank Rate is that
which the Bank of England charges on loans to discount houses and dealers
of Treasury Bills. This lowers interest rates and makes money supply
looser, aiding investment. Although the Rate is set by monetary authori-




Vols. 799-801, Issues 825-830.
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government and the opposition. Of particular importance in these sessions,
a Labourite, Robert Sheldon, answered the Conservative attacks on the
budgetary measures more from a standpoint of trade union loyalty than as
a member of the government party. He criticized the role of the Treasury
as becoming too powerful and the House lacked the power to prepare and
examine the total alternative budgetary decisions. His criticism, though
mild, was directed at the total system of budget preparation that afforded
the Treasury the opportunity to present a budget but not really defend it in
Parliament. He apparently escaped censure or rebuke from his Labour
party by directing his remarks at the system instead of at the government
2
in power. Outside of this input, the remaining discussions fluctuated
from the marvelous initiative shown by the Chancellor (Labour Party M. P. 's)
to criticisms of the miserly approach to tax relief (Conservative Party
M. P. 's). Although the discussions were structured along party lines, the
number of members asking questions, requesting supporting statistics, or
seeking other information was quite extensive. The real debate and oppor-
tunity for amendments came in the fifth session after the second reading.
Jennings was right when he said that in debate most participants
who are knowledgeable in the area do all the debating unless amendments
3
to bills are examined in small committees. Since there are no small
The Times Company, The Times Guide to the House of Commons
(London: The Times Company, 1970), p. 40. In this entry lie was listed as
a past TGVYU Vice Chairman and a local Ashton trade union member.
2W eekly Hansard
,
Vol. 799, Issue 825, April 15, 1970, par. 1405.
3
Sir Ivor Jennings, K. B. E. , Q. C. , The British Constitution
(Cambridge, England: The University Pi ess , 1966), p. 85.
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standing committees to deal with the specifics of the Budget, the debate
should have involved experts in finance. From the fifth through the eighth
session, as the amendments were being offered, only a small number of
the Members of Parliament were involved. A review of these last four
sessions with some odd-400 paragraphs indicated besides the Treasury
Minister and the Chancellor, only ten Members of Parliament from the
entire body were in the debate. Five of these ten members were on the
Public Accounts Committee, a committee of the Commons that examines
the accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by Parliament to
2
meet public expenditures and audits the same for propriety. Another had
been an ex -Financial Secretary to the Treasury. Three of them had served
3
on their respective internal party finance committees.
Regarding their political affiliation, seven of the ten were Con-
servatives with two Labourites and one Liberal. Although no connection
was found directly to the CBI, four of the seven had been directors of com-
panies. Robert Sheldon, a Labourite, as previously mentioned, had a past
affiliation with the Transport and General Workers' Union, one of the Big
4
Six trade unions. These ten members carried the debate as the Conserva-
tives only proposed the amendments.
Weekly Hansard
,
Vols. 800-801, Issues 828-830, May 1-7, 8-15,
and 26-29, pars. 1069-1199, 1259-1343, and 1800-1919. Based on a review
of the debates.
2
Brittain, The British Budgetary System, p. 263.
3 4The Times Guide to the House of Commons. Ibid.
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Clauses 11, 12, and 13 of the Finance Bill regarding income tax,
surtax, ana corporation tax, respectively, took up most of the time. The
Conservative Members of Parliament first approached a nine -pence
deduction on the basic income tax from 8 shillings 3 pence on the pound to
7 shillings 6 pence on the pound. They claimed that the Labour Government
had increased taxes for the last six years and no relief had been given.
Finally, they recommended a 3 -pence reduction instead. In the end, the
solid Labour Party voted down the amendment 231 votes to 153. On
clause 12, the sliding scale of surtax was recommended by the Conserva-
tives, not quite the 5, 000 -pound base that the CBI had requested, but a
3, 000 -pound base. This surtax would be charged with smaller percentages
as the income went over 3, 000 pounds than the government proposed. This,
2
too, met its demise by a vote of 229 to 150. The Conservatives brought in
an amendment to reduce corporation tax 2. 5 per cent to the level of 42. 5
per cent requested by the CBI. Patrick Jenkin, a Conservative, used the
comparison of the TUC and CBI methods of reporting profits, to which
Sheldon retorted that management should get more flexible and pull its own
weight. Needless to say, this also was voted down 221 to 152, and the
3
Conservatives had not changed the major portions of the Budget. The
remaining items concerned the minor portions, such as the personal relief
structures, betting and licensing machines, tobacco, excises, etc. , and
Weekly Hansard
,








May 13, 1970, par. 1342.
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they, too, were passed as recommended by the Chancellor, with slight
amendments in Schedules 6 and 7, taxation of capital element in mineral
royalty and stamp duties. These amendments were more of form than
substance.
It appears that the Budget for this year was an appeasement mea-
sure to both interest groups, some minor changes that appeared beneficial
to the TUC as well as some measures that benefited the CBI. While this
may not be clear-cut evidence of a pattern on budget processing, it does
represent the basic nature of the process of budgets from the representa-
tions to the Finance Act. Additionally, there are some other close corre-
lations of the events. This session lasted eight days. Budgets for the years
1945 through 1950 were, respectively, 9, 13, 7, 11. 5, and 14 days, or an
average of just less than 9 days. Moreover, the membership at voting
time on amendments was rather low--i. e.
,
384 for the income Tax vote,
which according to Clift is comparable basically to the votes cast on other
2
budgets. This analysis is not only indicative of the Chancellor's viewpoint
and how Parliament reacts, but it also shows that large, proposed eco-
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Samuel Beer, perhaps the ablest American student of British
politics, has commented: "If we had some way of measuring polit-
ical power, we could possibly demonstrate that at the present time
pressure groups are more powerful in Britain than in the United
States. The realization that this might be the case appears to have
grown rapidly in Britain in recent years and, in most quarters, the
reaction to it has been gloomy, indeed, among many publicists the
gloom has given way to outright despair." *
If one accepts this over -all generalization about the role of groups
in the British political process, then one would expect the largest, formally
organized groups to have a tremendous impact on the Budget. After all, if
groups are so powerful, it would be a natural assumption that the largest,
formally organized groups must command the most power. This power as
a result of its size must enable the groups to have a large impact on the
budgetary process. Such a hypothesis cannot be drawn in the instant case
for the following reasons.
First, the role of the Chancellor and the arena in which he works
do not permit a wide scope of influence. The Chancellor is the real power
by being the Cabinet Minister responsible for economic policy. The major
R. T. McKenzie, Parties, Pressure Groups and the Brit ish
Political Process, in Studies in British Politics
,
edited by Richard Rose
(London: Macmillan &; Co. , Ltd. , 1966), p. 255, citing Samuel Beer,
"Pressure Groups and Parties in Great Britain, " American Political Sci-
ence Preview
,




job for the interest groups is to convince him of their proposals. Although
they present advice and information to him, the secrecy, in turn, prohibits
worthwhile discussions and arguments relative to the interest groups' pro-
posals. Each interest group must plan its attack on its perception of the
state of the economy and where the Chancellor will place his priorities. In
doing so, they risk a dilution of the real issues that the Chancellor might be
contemplating so that their efforts may indeed be misdirected. His choices
of policy will not be discovered until the fateful day in the Commons.
Secondly, entry to the Chancellor by way of the other Cabinet min-
isters is also negated by the secrecy element. During budget time, the
Chancellor is in contact with individual ministers on various elements of
the budget, yet the over -all picture is not revealed to the Cabinet until just
before the Budget Speech, with this piecemeal information and the secrecy
involved, the Cabinet minister is not ab'.c to communicate any valid informa-
tion back to the interest group. The sanctions against such action would lead
to his political demise as well as to severe criminal penalties. On the
other hand, he may convey information to the Chancellor; yet, with the tech-
nical assistance he has in the Treasury and his own contacts with interest
groups, the impact of such information should be minimal. The Cabinet is
a collective responsibility unit; yet, in budgetary decisions, the ministers'
prerogatives have been defaulted to the Chancellor over the years. More-
over, their concern is on expenditures for their own departments and favor-




For a third reason, there is the inactivity in the Commons from
Finance Bill to Finance Act. The influence of interest groups through
sponsored members of the Commons is minimal through the nature of party-
politics, and the participation of the members themselves. If the sponsored
member is of the opposition party, the chances of amendment are very small
lajority would vote it down. For the sake of party cohesion and
unity, sponsored members of the majority party would not recommend any
amendments that would publicly air differences within the party. Any such
amendments by this section would be discussed in private caucus and then,
if necessary, introduced by the government. Additionally, there is a sense
of futility to the process during this time, as evidenced by the low attendance
;
,.nd the low participation rate. This futility is directly attributable
to the fact that budgets are passed quite intact and in a relatively short
period of tine. It appears reasonable to say that the government proposes,
discusses, and passes the bills through the Commons and not with the
Commons.
Bargaining with the government is a two-way proposition and this
iig process necessitates responsible action on the part of the inter-
est groups. The TUC and CBI are spokesmen for their members only as
far as their members allow. If the government grants some economic con-
cessions in the budget, in return they would expect that the TUC guarantees
against paralyzing strikes and the CBI guarantees increased productivity,
autonomy of the members of the organization prevents any such
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guarantees; consequently, the TUC and the CBI enter such bargaining ses-
sions with insufficient power to be truly representative. It may be argued
that the government has a duty to these interests to perform without guaran-
tees; however, decision-making powers still reside in the elected govern-
ment. For this reason, the groups' interests may not be considered the
national interest as seen by the government.
We have seen that both the TUC and the CBI have established meth-
ods and routes for influencing government decisions on the budget. They
are formally organized and given recognition by the government. They
participate in many quasi -official bodies of the government. They have
established friendly contacts both in the Ministries and in Parliament. Yet,
they have viot carried their appeals down to all the people. At no time do
they concentrate on receiving support fiom the public at large. The TUC
Annual Conference is concerned with speeches, elections, and the policies
of the Big Six. While this event reaches every facet of the mass media,
budgetary considerations are relegated to discussions on the last day,
probably too late to achieve any mass impact. By this time, the public is
turned out of the festivities at those ocean-side resorts. Besides, the poli-
cies generated are only a mirror of the Big Six voting bloc which is a cause
of frustration to the many other small trade unions. The CBI does not hold
any annual conference, nor does its pronouncement receive full-scale
coverage. In dealing with the politics of the budgetary process, neither
group resorts to the mass lobbying techniques so prevalent in America.
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Characteristic of British politics, they operate solely on established, formal
lines. The representations that both groups publish are for sale; yet, for
the most part they do not receive any wide external distribution. For these
reasons, the groups do not engender a total mass support for their proposals.
Finally, the over -all priorities of their proposals are diametrically
different. The proposals of the TUC are slanted towards less personal
income taxes and more government control of the economy. The CBI propo-
sals are more concerned with less government intervention and taxation
policies that affect the corporate iinage of their member such as direct
corporation taxes and investment incentives. While both groups propose
general taxation reduction, the major emphases of these reductions are not
compatible. For this reason, the government has the final authority and
uses its own perception of the economy to make the necessary fiscal deci-
sions. The nature of the groups' proposals is also so extensive that it
appears that the groups ask for much more than they expect to get; conse-
quently, they lack a definitiveness of purpose that affects their influence.
I feel a smaller interest group with a single purpose and priority has a
much better opportunity to achieve its purpose than the larger, multipurpose
groups in dealing with government.
This is the present picture, nevertheless: both the TUC and CBI
have the potential to exert a tremendous influence on the Budget. What they
both need is to solidify their position internally and to effect changes in
the present budgetary process. Although they have acquired good working
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relations with the government, they need to eradicate the autonomous nature
of their membership. In this way the government will treat them as true
representatives of the groups. In achieving this singular distinction, both
will enjoy a more responsible position in relation to the government. This
added responsibility can only further their influence and elicit a more
responsive government. Relations with each other must also improve so
that they both approach the government with a unity of purpose. Such uni-
fied purposes will produce an economy that allows more consideration for
their proposals. The best way to change the budgetary process is to attack
the secrecy aspect. Full and open disclosure of budget decisions before
they are enacted will permit a more conducive, collective approach to
budgeting. John Mackintosh's concept of a Select Committee on Taxation
or a Select Committee on Economic Affairs would create such a public
forum. With such committees, continuing discussions can provide an
educational outlet on sensible but unpopular taxes as well as bring to light
areas that necessitate full and thorough investigation. Budgets do repre-
sent national priorities and financial plans for the future, but there is no
need to permit their formulation behind the closed doors of the Treasury
or within the responsibility of one person.
John Mackintosh, M. P., "The House of Commons a)id Taxation, "
Political Quarterly
,
XLII (January -March, 1971), 75-86.

APPENDIX
GLOSSARY OF BRITISH BUDGETARY TERMS
Appropriation Act The summer legislation granting the Treasury
the authority to make expenditures from the
Consolidated Fund. Corresponds to the Ameri
can Appropriation.
Cabinet Elected by the leaders of the Majority Party
from the Members of Parliament of the Majority
Party. The leader, as Prime Minister, can have
as many ministers in the Cabinet as he desires.
Comparable to the American Cabinet except legis-
lative authority also granted to the British Cabinet
members since they hold parliamentary seats.
Civil List Annual payment which Parliament grants by
statute at the beginning of each reign for the Sov-
ereign and the Royal Household. Usually more
than one gran: since successive Civil Lists are
for other Royal Family members.
Committee of the
Whole House
The entire membership of the House of Commons,
Two types exist: Committee of Supply and Com-
mittee of Ways and Means. Corresponds to the
entire House of Representatives.
Committee of Supply
Committee of Ways and
Means
A Committee of the Whole House that is substan-
tive in nature and votes all expenditure. Corres-
ponds to Appropriations Committee.
Another Committee of the Whole House responsible
for authorization of money out of the Consolidated
Fund and finding ways of financing issues out of the
Consolidated Fund. This would correspond to a
separate committee that discusses ways to finance




Consolidated Fund The one fund into which shall flow every stream
of public revenue and from which shall issue the





The documents that the government presents to
Parliament by way of asking for a given sum for a
particular service and showing in detail how the
sum is to be spent. Corresponds to some expendi-
tures of the American Budget since some appropri
ations inay be multi-year but estimates are annual.
The Revenue and Expenditure work sheets in the
Budget Committee of the Treasury. Corresponds
to the Office of Management and Budget work in
summer when preliminary estimates of expenditures
are related to revenue outlook with the Treasury
and Council of Economic Advisors.
Finance Act An Act to grant certain duties, to alter other duties,
and to amend the law relating to the National Debt
and the Public Revenue, and to make further provi-
sion in connection with Finance.
Financial Statement The Statement brings together all the figures that
the Chancellor uses in his Budget Speech. The final





Act of 1913 that gives the government the right to
put into operation changes of taxation on the day
following Budget Day. Applies only to variations or
renewals of existing taxes.
There are various types of taxes in British Budgets
of which the following are major:
Income Tax --the standard rate for all persons is




-an extra charge on incomes over a pre-
determined level currently set at 2, 500 pounds.
Corpor ation Tax- -a tax both on profits and the capi
tal gains of companies. The tax is assessed on
profits of accounting periods.
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Estate Duty - -a duty that is chargeable on the value
of all property that passes at death. Not limited
to property owned by deceased but also trust funds
and to gifts made by deceased within seven years
of his death.
Capital Gains - -personal disposal of assets and lia-
bility. Rate for persons other than companies is
30 per cent.
;
>ms and Excise Duties - -duties on tobacco,
nolic drinks, protective duties, and betting
duties to name a few. Generally considered indi-
rect tax as they are paid by manufacturer or
importer and passed on to the consumer.
Purchase Tax- -a charge on a wide range of goods,
normally consumer variety, as a sales tax equiva-
lent. Four rates exist, depending on the category
of goods: 13. 75 per cent, 22 per cent, 36. 66 per
cent, and 55 per cent.
• ,ing Duties --the pool betting duty for football
pools and other bets by coupons at fixed odds.
General betting duty is on other types of betting.
Motor Vehic le License Fee --tax on motor vehicles
set at 25 pounds yearly.
Selective Employment Tax- -a tax paid by all
employers on all employees working for them.
The rate is a weekly fixed rate of 48 shillings for
nen, 24 shillings for women and boys, and 16
illings for girls.
Treasury A department of the British Government that sets
management policy for all government departments,
controls Civil Service regulations, assists in budget
ary preparation, develops planning forecasts, and
exercises extreme expenditure control. Corres -
ponds to a combination of the troika of America's
Office of Management and Budget, Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, and the Treasury, in addition to




Votes The deed by which Parliament actually grants
and appropriates the sum for a stated service,
Votes on Account Since Supply is voted every year for one year
only, ending on March 31, and none may be
carried over, it is necessary to vote interim
measures until Parliament can authorize total
Supply. With the estimates in February, Parlia
ment votes four or five months against the total
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